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1.  Introduction.  
 
In the early 1950s, the prevailing model of consumption behaviour used by macro-economists 
was inspired by the ‘fundamental psychological law’ mentioned by Keynes (1936) in the General 
Theory. At that time, the theoretical and empirical limitations of that model became increasingly 
clear. From a theoretical perspective, it is difficult to construct coherent models based on 
intertemporal optimizing behaviour that are consistent with Keynes’ description of the 
‘fundamental psychological law’. From an empirical point of view, it seemed that Keynes’ view 
was inconsistent with a number of facts, both at the macro and the micro level. At the 
aggregate level, for instance, it was observed that the marginal propensity to consume out of 
disposable income was lower in the short run than in the long run. In cross sections, on the 
other hand, saving rates seemed to change systematically with the level of income. Moreover, it 
was observed that groups of individuals with, on average, lower level of income (such as 
blacks) had higher saving rates than other groups with higher levels of average income (such as 
whites) at any income level.  Finally, it was observed that saving rates are systematically related to 
changes in income, being higher for individuals experiencing income increases and lower for 
individuals experiencing income decreases (see Katona, 1949).   
All these observations clearly contradicted the implications of the Keynesian model and led to 
the formulation of the life cycle and permanent income models (Modigliani and Brumberg, 
1954, 1980 and Friedman, 1957). These models combined theoretical consistency, in that 
intertemporal consumption and saving choices were set within a coherent optimization 
problem, with the ability of fitting most of the facts mentioned in the previous paragraph. The 
saving rates of blacks was (and is) higher than that of whites, at any income level, because the 
permanent income of blacks is lower and therefore, conditioning on a common income level, 
one selects the blacks with higher level of temporary shocks that should, according to the model, 
be saved. Similarly, individuals with income increases are more likely to be affected by positive 
transitory shocks. At the macro level, short run fluctuations in disposable income are more 
likely to be dominated by the variance of temporary shocks that would be averaged out in the 
long run. Some of these facts still hold in modern data, as we document in Section 2.   
The development of the ideas in the seminal contributions of Modigliani and Blumberg and 
Friedman also led to the realization of other implications. In a simple version of the life cycle 
model, if income is hump shaped and declines at retirement, consumers will save when they are 
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Modigliani and Blumberg then showed that this fact can explain the correlation between 
aggregate growth and aggregate saving: growth implies that, in a given year, younger cohorts, 
who are saving, are ‘richer’ in life-time terms, than older ones, who are dis-saving. The higher 
the rate of growth is, the larger the difference in resources between savers and dis-savers and, 
therefore, the higher the aggregate rate of saving.  
After its initial development, the other important step in the development of the life-cycle/ 
permanent income model, which is currently used as the standard workhorse of modern 
macroeconomics, was a rigorous treatment of uncertainty. In the late 1970s, the contributions 
of Hall (1978) (and MaCurdy (1981, 1999) in the context of labour supply) exploited the idea of 
using the first order conditions of the intertemporal optimization problem faced by the 
consumer to derive testable implications of the model. This approach, known as the Euler 
equation approach, makes possible the empirical analysis of a problem that is analytically 
intractable by circumventing the need to derive closed form solutions. This is achieved by 
focusing on the economic essence of the model: consumers, at the optimum, will act to keep 
the marginal utility of wealth constant over time. The marginal utility of wealth is at the same 
time a sufficient statistic for consumer choices and, given its dynamic properties, can be 
‘differenced out’ in a way which is analogous to the treatment of fixed effects in econometrics.  
The Euler equation approach became the standard approach as it allowed to both test the 
validity of the model and to estimate some of the structural parameters of the utility function. 
A hypothesis that received much attention, since Hall (1978), is that lagged values of income, 
or predictable changes in income, do not predict future consumption once current 
consumption is accounted for. Perhaps as a consequence of this focus on testing, when it came 
to policy analysis and debates the model and in particular the empirical evidence that has been 
accumulated on it have been rarely used. One of the reasons for this divorce between the 
literature on the life cycle model and what should have been its practical use in the design and 
evaluation of public policy stems from the fact that the Euler equation does not deliver a 
consumption function. While it can be used to test the model and estimate some of its 
parameters, it cannot be used to determine the effects of specific policy changes on 
consumption or saving.  
At the same time, much of the evidence that came to be perceived as the accepted view, 
pointed to rejections of the life cycle model that took the form of ‘excess sensitivity’ of 
consumption to income. Indeed, in the next section, we take this evidence as one of the 
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utility for policy analysis. We have two main goals: to take a stand on where the literature is and 
what the main issues are and to discuss the public policy implications of the life cycle/ 
permanent income models. 
 
The life cycle model can be loosely defined as a framework where individuals maximize utility 
over time given a set of intertemporal trading opportunities. Even at this level of generality, the 
model is of some usefulness. It establishes a conceptual framework that treats the 
intertemporal allocation of resources in a way which is similar   to the allocation of resources 
among different commodities. Decisions will then depend on the total amount of resources (in 
the intertemporal context: current and future income as well as current wealth), on preferences 
over the different commodities (in the intertemporal context: present and future consumption, 
and possibly bequests) and on relative prices (interest rates and intertemporal trade 
opportunities).  
Without being more specific, however, it is not possible to say much more than what stated in 
the previous paragraph. Or, saying it differently, this level of generality encompasses many 
different types of behaviour and has almost no testable implications. In what follows, therefore, 
we construct a specific model and analyze its components. This exercise forces us to make a 
number of strong assumptions and modelling choices that we discusse below. We choose to 
work with a version of the model that is flexible enough to be brought in a serious way to the 
data and that allows us to derive specific implications on a number of policy-relevant questions.  
We start our approach by discussing, in Section 2, a number of empirical findings. We refer to 
both time series and cross sectional findings and we focus especially on results that might point 
to empirical rejections of the model. We organize our discussion of the empirical evidence in 
two parts. We first discuss evidence that refers to individual consumption behaviour. We then 
move on to look at evidence derived from movements in the distribution of consumption, 
which allows researchers to look at the functioning of markets and the smoothing of various 
types of shocks.  
After reviewing this empirical evidence, in Section 3 we discuss how a relatively standard but 
sufficiently rich version of the life cycle model can be made consistent with it. Moreover, we 
discuss the evidence on the size of the relevant structural parameters. Having established that 
the model is not wildly at variance with the data and some of the evidence that was presented 
as a rejection of the life cycle model can be reconciled with it if one specifies a version that is 
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properties. In particular, we show how consumption changes with changes in income and 
interest rates for different values of the structural parameters. The use of simulations is 
necessary in this context because it is not possible to obtain closed form solutions.  
Simulations are also useful to study aspects of life cycle behaviour that cannot be studied with 
the Euler equation approach (such as durables, housing etc.), because transaction costs lead to 
infrequent adjustments. 
Besides preferences and income processes, the other important component of the life cycle 
model is the intertemporal budget constraint. A specific hypothesis about the nature of the 
intertemporal budget constraint implicitly assumes a certain market structure and the 
instruments consumer have to move resources over time (and across states of the world). 
Section 4, therefore, is devoted to the discussion of alternative market structures, starting from 
the benchmark of complete markets to move on to various models of incomplete markets.  
One of the themes of the paper and in particular of Section 3 is that one can construct rich 
versions of the life cycle of the model that are not inconsistent with some aspects of the micro 
data and can be useful in the conduct of policy analysis. Having said that, it is clear that the 
simplest versions of the model are inconsistent with various aspects of the data and that the 
empirical literature on consumption has accumulated a number of puzzles. In Section 5, we 
discuss some of these puzzles and possible extensions and modifications of the basic model. 
Section 6 concludes the paper.    
2.  Facts. 
 
In this section, we present some well known facts about consumption behaviour both at the 
aggregate and at the micro level. Our aim is to present empirical evidence that is or might be 
relevant to judge the validity of the life cycle model. Indeed, many of the facts that we list 
below were presented as explicit tests of the life cycle/ permanent income model and 
sometimes interpreted as rejections of the model.  In addition to these facts, however, we will 
also report some new evidence on old findings that motivated the development of the life cycle 
model.  
We divide the empirical evidence we present in two parts. We first discuss findings that refer to 
individual behaviour. In this first subsection, we consider how individual consumption moves, 
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1. We then move on to facts about the cross sectional dispersion of consumption 
and interpret movements in time of these moments as informative about risk sharing and 
insurance markets available to individuals.  
2.1. Average Individual behaviour.  
 
As was mentioned in the introduction, the life-cycle/ permanent income model was developed 
to explain some facts about consumption. Some of these facts were noticed in aggregate 
statistics: (non-durable) consumption expenditure is less volatile than income and the marginal 
propensity to consume seems to be smaller in the short run than in the long run. These ‘macro 
facts’ still hold and some can also be found in micro data (such as the relative variability of non 
durable consumption and income - see Attanasio, 2000, and Attanasio and Borella, 2006). 
Other facts explicitly mentioned by the seminal contributions that originated the life cycle/ 
permanent income model emerged from cross sectional studies and in particular from 
observations of how saving rates vary in the cross section with income. As with the ‘macro’ 
facts, these empirical regularities still hold in recent data. If one looks at US Consumer 
Expenditure Survey (CEX) data, one finds that the saving rate of blacks is higher than that of 
whites at any income level, as noted by Friedman (1957). Similar evidence can be obtained in US 
and UK if one looks at the saving rates by current income level of other groups that differ by 
the level of ‘permanent’ income, such as households headed by individuals with different levels 
of education.  Analogously, if one considers separately individuals whose income has increased 
and individuals whose income has decreased, the saving rate of the latter is smaller than that of 
the former, as noted fifty years ago by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954), citing work by 
Margaret G. Reid.  
The fact that these empirical regularities still hold is important and we come back to them 
when discussing the empirical validity of the life cycle model.  At this stage, we simply stress 
that the life cycle/ permanent income model offers a coherent explanation for them. The main 
ideas behind the use of the life cycle model to explain these facts, is that consumers have 
concave utility functions and therefore prefer smooth paths of consumption (over time and 
across states of the world) over variable ones. Therefore, only unanticipated changes in income 
that are perceived as permanent will induce substantive changes in consumption. Expected and 
temporary changes to income should not induce a strong change in consumption. The 
                                                 
1 Which moment is considered to represent the measure of location of the distribution of individual consumption 
is an interesting issue which we discuss in what follows.  
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the changes in income considered in these stylized facts are temporary. For instance, if one 
classifies individuals with different levels of permanent income by the level of current income, 
one will find that, for each current income level, individuals from the group with a lower level 
of permanent income will have a higher level of temporary income, which, the model suggests, 
should be saved. 
Interestingly, the empirical criticisms of the life cycle model that have been accumulating since 
have mainly pointed out deviations from the prediction that expected changes in income 
should not be incorporated into consumption. These deviations can be classified into three 
groups: those that identify correlations between expected changes in income and consumption 
at low frequencies,  those that consider short-run fluctuations linked to changes in earnings and 
income and those that refer to short-run fluctuations that are linked to ad-hoc payments not 
necessarily related to labour supply behaviour.  
Low frequency, life-cycle patterns. Carroll and Summers (1991), in an influential paper, show that life 
cycle profiles of income and consumption track each other. For many countries both income 
and consumption life cycle profiles are hump shaped, in that they increase during the first part 
of the life cycle to reach a peak a few years before retirement and decline afterwards. Groups 
and countries that exhibit relatively ‘steep’ income profiles also exhibit relatively ‘steep’ 
consumption profiles. Carroll and Summers, therefore, conclude that income and consumption 
track each other over the life cycle, therefore contradicting one of the main predictions of the 
life cycle model.   
We reproduce this type of graph in Figure 1, where we report life cycle profiles for disposable 
income and non durable consumption for two education groups in the UK (the FES data used 
here cover the 1978-2007 sample period). We thus adopt the same methodology as Carroll and 
Summers (1991). The message that comes out of these pictures is very similar to theirs: at life 
cycle frequencies, consumption profiles do follow income profiles. (This is even more strikingly 
true if total expenditure replaces non-durable consumption). 
A drawback with this type of graphs is that they average over individuals by age, irrespective of 
their year of birth. If different generations have access to different life-cycle resources (as 
assumed in the life-cycle model) this is not the right thing to do. In figure 2, we show what 
happens when the data are grouped in year of birth cohorts – and averages are then taken by 
age. (In the figure, cohorts are 10-year wide). There is still evidence of income tracking, even 
though this is now less clear cut.  
  7Do these pictures constitute a fundamental rejection of the life cycle model? In the next 
section, we will be arguing formally that the answer is no, both in theory and in practice. Here 
we simply point out that if one wants to be serious about bringing the life cycle model to the 
data, one cannot take the simplest version, which is used for pedagogical reasons, but has to 
take into account that, in all likelihood, consumption needs evolve over time as family 
composition changes. This argument is made by Attanasio and Browning (1995).  
The simplest way to start considering this type of issues is to look at life cycle profiles for 
consumption that take into account changes in needs, by considering consumption per capita 
or consumption per adult equivalent, rather than total household consumption. Figure 3 
reproduces Figure 2, but using consumption per adult equivalent
2. As can be noticed the 
profiles for consumption are now much flatter. We come back to these pictures and to the 
interpretation of this evidence in what follows.  
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Figure 1 Average income and (non-durable) consumption by education 
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Figure 3 Average per-capita income and consumption by cohort and education 
 
Arguably the largest predictable change in income is the one that occurs at retirement: earnings 
decline considerably as individuals exit the labour force and such decline should be anticipated. 
An obvious prediction of the life-cycle model of Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) is that 
individuals, who should have accumulated wealth (either in private assets or in entitlements to 
pension benefits) should start de-cumulating it to keep a level of consumption consistent to the 
one afforded before retirement. Hamermesh (1984) was the first to argue that consumers 
apparently do not save enough to achieve this aim. If households enter retirement with 
inadequate savings, they must cut their consumption level, contrary to the life-cycle model 
predictions. 
The recent literature has focused on estimating how consumption levels change around 
retirement. The existence of a consumption fall around retirement is documented for the UK 
(Banks, Blundell and Tanner, 1998), for the US (Bernheim, Skinner and Weinberg, 2001), and 
for Italy (Battistin, Brugiavini, Rettore and Weber, 2009) and has come to be known as the 
retirement consumption puzzle (or retirement savings puzzle). Banks, Blundell and Tanner 
(1998) find that for ages between 60 and 67, the level of consumption is lower than that 
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cumulated consumption shortfall over this age band, where most people retire, is around 10%. 
For the US, Bernheim, Skinner and Weinberg (2001) estimate a median drop of 14%, but 
higher drops for low wealth, low income replacement households. They conclude that "31% of 
the sample reduce their consumption by at least 35 percentage points". Battistin, Brugiavini, 
Rettore and Weber (2009), who use Italian data, estimate at 9.8 percent the part of the non-
durable consumption drop that is associated with retirement (food expenditure falls instead by 
14%).  
Business Cycle Frequency. The evidence mentioned so far refers to a relationship between 
predictable changes in income and consumption at the life cycle frequency. Many papers have 
also looked at the relationship at higher frequencies. This work is typically based on the Euler 
equations that we will be discussing in the next section, but basically tests the hypothesis that, 
conditional on current consumption, future consumption is not affected by predicted changes 
in income, or current level of income. This prediction is obviously related to the observations 
made by the early proponents of the life cycle/ permanent income hypothesis between the lack 
of strong correlation between changes in consumption and income both in cross sections and 
in the time series. Many studies in the 1980s, instead, found strong rejections of this prediction. 
Campbell and Mankiw (1989), in one of the best known and cited papers, found that regressing 
changes in aggregate US log consumption on interest rates and changes in log disposable 
income, the latter variable attracted a coefficient of 0.4, statistically different from zero, even 
after instrumenting current variables with lagged ones to avoid picking up the effects of 
innovations to the level of permanent income. Cambpell and Mankiw (1991) replicate the 
evidence for the US for a variety of other countries and attribute such a result to the presence 
of a large number of consumers who follow a ‘rule of thumb’ and set their consumption equal 
or proportional to their income.  
Hall and Mishkin (1982), perform a similar exercise, but using micro data from the US. Using 
data on food consumption from the PSID, they find a significant correlation between changes 
in food consumption and lagged changes in income. They interpret this evidence as indicating 
that about 20% of households set consumption on the basis of current income, rather than 
following the life cycle model. Another study that has uses micro data is by Zeldes (1989). He 
uses the same data as Hall and Mishkin (1982), but distinguishes between consumers with low 
level of assets and high level of assets and finds that the consumption for the former group is 
more linked to income than the consumption of the latter. Zeldes (1989) explicitly refers to the 
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borrowing that do not allow them to set current consumption at the desired level. We come 
back to the issue of liquidity constraints in the next section. 
The evidence mentioned so far is relevant for the life cycle model as it exploits the implications 
of the theoretical framework for changes in consumption. In the next section we map directly 
this evidence on the theoretical framework of the life cycle model. However, it is also possible, 
albeit more complicated, to derive implications of some version of the model for the level of 
consumption. Intuitively, the theoretical framework implies that innovations to permanent 
income should be fully incorporated in consumption
3, while innovations to transitory 
consumption of income should not. Therefore, if one specifies a time series model of 
consumption and income and identifies the permanent innovations to the latter variable, the 
model predicts that these innovations should be translated one to one into consumption. This 
implies cross equation parametric restrictions on the VAR representation that can be estimated. 
Campbell and Deaton (1989) pointed out these restrictions and, using aggregate time series 
data, found that consumption seems to be too smooth in that it does not react sufficiently to 
innovations to the permanent component of income. Similar findings were obtained by West 
(1988), Galì (1991) and Hansen Roberds and Sargent (1991). Perhaps surprisingly, no similar 
test on micro data was performed until the recent paper by Attanasio and Pavoni (2009), who 
also find ‘excess smoothness’.
4   
Predicted changes in income. The changes in income that we have considered so far are large 
predictable changes that occur over the life cycle and/or changes that are likely to be related to 
changes in labour supply. In recent years, a small literature has developed that studies how 
consumption varies in relation to changes in income that are not only predictable, but also 
driven by events that do not have any implications for hours worked or labour force 
participation. In particular, a large number of papers have looked at the effects of tax refunds 
or other changes linked to administrative issues. Papers in this literature include Souleles 
(1999), Parker (1999), Hsieh (2003), Browning and Collado (2001) and Stephens (2007). 
Souleles, Parker, Stephens and, in part, Hsieh find that consumption reacts to changes in the 
level of resources available to consumers that are fully predictable. Browning and Collado, on 
the other hand, as well as the second part of Hsieh’s paper, find that consumers do not 
                                                 
3 We are abstracting here from the possibility of insuring permanent shocks and implicitly considering a consumer 
who has access to a fairly limited portfolio of assets to move resources over time and across states of the world.  
4 An exception is Deaton (1992b). 
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results later.   
2.2.   The evolution of the cross sectional evolution of consumption 
In the previous subsection, we have listed a number of ‘facts’ that have been discussed in the 
literature on the empirical implications of the life cycle model. All of the evidence there 
referred to the properties of consumption levels and consumption changes, on average (either by 
looking at aggregate data or, in the case of individual data to regressions aimed at identifying 
the behaviour of the average consumer). The evolution of the cross section distribution of 
consumption – and income- , however, can also be very informative about the relevant model 
that describes the data.  
One of the first papers to notice the implications of a simple version of the life cycle model for 
the evolution of consumption inequality was Deaton and Paxson (1994). These authors notice 
that if income has a unit root, in a basic life cycle model, the cross sectional section of 
consumption increases over time. One can then consider how the cross sectional variance of 
consumption for a cohort of individuals born in the same year should increase over time as 
these individuals age. Testing this forecast for the UK, the US and Taiwan, Deaton and Paxson 
(1994) show that this is effectively the case. As innovations accumulate, the cross sectional 
distribution of consumption fans out with age. 
5 
Battistin , Blundell and Lewbell (2009) use a similar argument to explain a remarkable empirical 
regularity: the cross sectional distribution of consumption seems to be extremely well 
approximated by a log normal. This is true across a wide variety of countries. Under a standard 
version of the life cycle model, at any age, (log) consumption is given by past (log) 
consumption plus a term that reflects an innovation to permanent income. Therefore, by 
recursive substitution, one gets that log consumption is given by the sum of innovations from 
the beginning of life to the current age. By the central limit theorem, the sum of independent 
                                                 
5 Using repeated cross sectional data or longitudinal data, one can follow the evolution of consumption inequality 
for any given cohort and estimate how it evolves with age and time.  The identification of an average ‘age profile’ 
for the variance of consumption that is common for different time periods and different cohorts, is complicated 
by the fact that age., time and cohort are obviously linked and, without additional restrictions or structure, it is not 
possible to identify separately age, cohort and time effects. Deaton and Paxson (1994) assume some restrictions on 
time effects. A forthcoming issue of the Review of Economic Dynamics contains a collection of papers from 
different countries (including the US and the UK) that undertake similar exercises. The shape of the age profile in 
the US seems to depend crucially on whether one considers total household consumption or consumption per 
adult equivalent and which adult equivalence schemes are used.  
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individual innovations are not normally distributed.  
The facts about the evolution of the cross sectional inequality of consumption and income are 
also used in another study by Blundell and Preston (1998). Under a specific market assumption, 
they show that the relative evolution of consumption and income inequality can be used to 
identify permanent and transitory income variances. The idea is relatively simple: if consumers 
face a simple asset market structure, changes in the variance of the permanent component of 
income will induce an equal increase in the cross sectional variance of consumption. Therefore 
the difference between the increase in the cross sectional variance of income and that of 
consumption will identify the changes in the cross sectional variance of transitory income. 
The caveat about the market structure in the last paragraph makes it clear that there is a 
stringent relationship between the type of insurance markets agents have access to and the 
evolution of consumption inequality. Given an initial distribution of consumption (however 
determined) in the presence of perfect risk sharing, that distribution should stay constant (with 
some technical caveats we will discuss in Section 4). Deaton and Paxson (1994) noticed that in 
a footnote and presented evidence on the evolution of the cross sectional variance of 
consumption as a rejection of the complete market model. In an ingenious paper, Jappelli and 
Pistaferri (2006) exploit that idea by looking explicitly at movements in the relative ranking in 
the consumption distribution in an Italian survey. As with other papers, they reject strongly the 
assumption of perfect risk sharing. 
Similarly, Attanasio and Davis (1996) by looking at the evolution of relative consumption across 
different education groups, and relating that to changes in relative wage changes interpret the 
evidence of a strong correlation at low frequencies between these two variables as evidence 
against the complete market hypothesis. Interestingly, Attanasio and Davis (1996) cannot reject 
the hypothesis that at relatively high frequencies (like one year) there is no relationship between 
consumption and relative wage changes. This seems to indicate that, somehow, at high 
frequencies wage shocks are absorbed and not reflected in consumption.  
Until the early 1990s, as reported also by Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008), consumption 
inequality has increased substantially, mirroring the increases in inequality in wages and 
earnings. After the early 1990s, however, the picture is less clear. Krueger and Perri (2009) 
report that the overall cross sectional variance of consumption in the US has not increased 
much. Attanasio, Battistin and Ichimura (2007), instead, find that the cross sectional inequality 
of consumption does increase even in the more recent period. Even though both papers use 
  14the US Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), it turns out that the main difference in the 
results of these two papers stems from the data used. The  CEX is made of two independent 
samples: one, called the interview survey, in which households are asked retrospective 
questions about their consumption in the quarter preceding the interview, while the other, the 
diary survey, in which households are asked to keep a diary for two weeks. It turns out that fact 
that Krueger and Perri use data from the interview survey, while Attanasio, Battistin and 
Ichimura integrate data from the two surveys, following the practice of the Bureau of Labour 
Statistics, which uses the diary survey for some commodities and the interview survey for 
others.  
The different evidence about the evolution of consumption inequality in the US emerging from 
two different components of the same survey, which is also the main sources of information 
on consumption at the micro level in the largest industrialized country in the world, justifies a 
small digression about the quality of consumption data. Information about expenditure and 
even more so about consumption is notoriously difficult to collect in developed countries.  At 
the same time, the importance of this information cannot be understated. Reliable information 
on consumption is key for a host of issues, ranging from the construction of price indexes, 
which are used to index a variety of payments, to the assessment of living conditions and the 
measurement of poverty, to the estimation of different models of individual behaviour and, 
ultimately, to the design of public policy. And yet, the resources spent in the collection of 
reliable consumption data are remarkably small. The CEX is a relatively small survey whose 
quality is perceived to have been deteriorating over the years.
6 While there are signs that data  
collection in developed countries has become harder as people seem less willing to respond to 
survey questions, a redesign and improvement of consumption surveys is, in our opinion, very 
important.  
3.  The Life-Cycle Model. 
 
In the first part of the previous section, we mentioned a number of ‘facts’, relating to both 
individual and aggregate consumption.  After a brief mention of the facts that motivated the 
development of the life cycle model (and that still hold in recent datasets), we discussed several 
                                                 
6 If one aggregates the CEX using the appropriate weights, one obtains only a fraction of aggregate Personal 
Consumption expenditure as measured in the National Accounts. Moreover, this fraction has been declining 
considerably.   
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implications of the theory. To summarize, some of these facts are: 
1)  The age profile of consumption is hump shaped, apparently tracking the age profile of 
income for each education group; moreover, groups of individuals that have ‘steep’ 
income age profiles, seem to have steep consumption age profiles; 
2)  Consumption drops at retirement;  
3)  The growth rate of consumption seems ‘too’ sensitive to predictable changes in 
income; 
4)  Consumption seems to react to changes in available resources that are fully predictable 
and transitory, such as tax refunds. 
In this section, we present the life cycle model in its modern form, and discuss to what extent it 
provides an explanation for the facts listed above. Facts that go under the first three headings, 
will be explained by the consideration that the model does not predict that individuals smooth 
their consumption but their marginal utility from consumption. We leave to the end of this 
section our interpretation of the facts under the fourth heading.   
The main idea of the life cycle model is a very general one: it can be stated by saying that 
consumers are supposed to allocate resources over time in order to maximize life time utility 
subject to a resource constraint. At this level of generality, the model does not have much 
empirical content and is not particularly useful. To bring it to bear on data and make it 
potentially falsifiable, we need to put a bit more structure on its various components. In 
particular, we have to specify the individual preferences that inform the maximization problem, 
the nature of the processes generating the resources available to consumers and the type of 
markets they have access to. In this section, we specify a basic life cycle model with an eye to 
the features that would help us to explain some of the facts we mention above. In addition, we 
also discuss how a version of the model that does fit the available data can be characterized and 
used in a variety of contexts. In Section 4, we discuss the implications for the model and its 
applications of the facts about the distribution of consumption discussed in the second part of 
Section 2.   
3.1. Preferences 
 
The version of the model we consider is one in which a consumer unit maximizes expected 
utility over a finite interval subject to a set of constraints 
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where C stands for “consumption”, z  for a potentially large vector of observable variables that 
affect utility (that may be chosen by the consumer, or given to her – this will normally include 
household composition variables), and v for unobservable factors also affecting utility. As we 
shall see demographics play a key role in explaining the way consumption varies with age, 
particularly in pre-retirement years. We let the discount factor
β  be time varying to take into 
account mortality risk (that helps explain why consumption falls in old age -  the survival 
probability falls with age, and this makes the consumer progressively more impatient). 
Throughout the paper we neglect the issue of how decisions are taken within the household, 
and simply assume the household behaves as a unit
7.  
The first constraint is a generic budget constraint where net worth appears together with its 
return, income and consumption. Some or all components of income can be simultaneously 
determined with consumption. For instance, it is possible that income is given by the wage rate 
times the number of hours worked, where the number of hours is one of the components of z. 
Equations (3) and (4) define net worth, W, and its return -   are the portfolio shares (or 
weights). The return on net worth is given by the weighted average of the individual returns, 
. We assume these returns do nor depend on the net position taken by the consumer on 
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7 In the collective model of decision making, households are normally assumed to select efficient allocations, as 
suggested in Chiappori (1988) – see Vermeulen (2002) for a survey of this in a static setting.  Browning (2000) is 
the first paper to look at the implications of relaxing the unitary model assumptions on intertemporal decisions. 
Mazzocco (2007) tackles the more general problem of household decision making in a T-period uncertain world, 
by deriving the Euler equations for individual and household consumption. He looks at the case where individuals 
can commit to future allocations of resources, and where commitment is instead not possible – because separation 
and divorce are a possible way out   
 
  17Equation (5) gives the limit for total net worth at period T. The consumer has to die without 
debt, that is, she has to pay back her debt with probability one. This simple restriction imposes 
quantitatively important limitations to the ability to smooth consumption. Suppose, for 
instance that the income process is not bounded away from zero and can actually take the value 
zero with some positive (small) probability. If we further assume that the marginal utility of 
consumption tends to infinity at very low levels of consumption, then the consumer will never 
want to borrow in such a situation. This is because the presence of debt together with the non-
bankruptcy constraint and the possibility that income takes the value of zero would imply 
assigning positive probability to zero or even negative consumption, which the consumer 
deeply dislikes. The consumer will then never want to borrow, even small amounts. One can 
generalize this to situations where the income process is bounded away from zero. In this case, 
the consumer will not want to borrow more than the present value of the lowest level of 
income. Similar considerations apply whenever the survival probability is less than one, if 
longevity risks cannot be fully insured. 
A number of important restrictions are assumed in this formulation. First, the consumer is 
assumed to maximize expected utility. This is a strong assumption which is often used in the 
literature. Sometimes the Von Neumann- Morgenstern framework is replaced with different 
axiomatic structures, such as the Kreps-Porteus axiomatization as parametrized by Epstein and 
Zin (1989, 1991)
8.  Second, we are assuming that preferences are additively separable over time. 
This precludes the consideration of various types of non-separability, ranging from durables to 
habit formation. We return to this issue below. Third, we are implicitly assuming that it is 
possible to write down utility as a function of a single commodity. This practice presupposes an 
aggregation theorem of the type studied by Gorman (1959).   
The problem formulated above is able to encompass different versions of the model that have 
been considered in the literature. In particular, we treat as special cases the standard permanent 
income/ life cycle model with quadratic preferences, the so-called buffer stock saving as well as  
flexible versions of the model (with an important role for demographics and labour supply) 
that have been fitted to the data.  
                                                 
8 Expected utility forces a negative relation between risk aversion and intertemporal substitution, but these are two 
distinct concepts. This prompted Epstein and Zin (1989) to propose an alternative model that is based on Kreps 
and Porteus (1978) preferences. Unlike expected utility optimizers, Kreps and Porteus consumers care about the 
time when uncertainty is resolved, even if they cannot take any action as a result. Epstein and Zin (1989) derive a 
full set of first order conditions – and show that the Euler equation involves not only consumption growth and 
the interest rate, but also the return on the market portfolio. Epstein and Zin (1991) and Attanasio and Weber 
(1989) present estimates of the Euler equation for this type of preferences. 
  18We shall show that the flexible versions of the model can indeed explain the first three stylised 
facts presented at the beginning of the section. In particular, we shall show that the hump in 
the age profile of consumption is due to the interplay of demographics and prudence, the 
excess sensitivity of consumption growth to income growth is due to the dependence of the 
marginal utility of consumption on leisure, while the retirement consumption drop is due partly 
to adverse shocks inducing retirement, partly to more efficient shopping that is made 
convenient  by the increased leisure time . 
In order to prove all this, we need to work out the solution to the optimization problem. Some 
features of the solution can be understood by looking at the first order conditions, others 
require the derivation of the consumption function, either analytically (in some special cases) or 
numerically. 
Let us start with a case where the consumption function can be derived analytically. Let utility 
be quadratic in consumption (and additively separable in its other arguments z), and assume 
that at least one financial asset is freely traded and yields a fixed real return, equal to the 
constant time preference parameter 
β
β − 1 . The first order condition with respect to 
consumption, or Euler equation, implies that consumption is a random walk: 
  t t t C I C E = + ) | ( 1                          (6) 
where I t denotes information available at time t (Hall, 1978). If consumers have rational 
expectations, then:  
                  0 ) | ( 1 1 1 = + = + + + t t t t t W E C C ε ε                     (7) 
 
for all variables W known at time t. Equation (7) can be used to derive a consumption function, 
in the case where no other asset is available to the consumer (as in Bewley, 1977) and the only 
stochastic variable is labour income. Substituting (7) into the budget constraints, Flavin (1991) 
shows that consumption is set equal to permanent income, defined as the interest rate times the 
present value of current and expected future incomes: 
 















=                         (8) 
 
Equation (8) is derived for the special case of infinite life, but an extension to finite life can be 
derived. 
  19In this model, the first difference in consumption, or the error term in (7), equals the present 
value of income revisions, due to the accrual of new information between periods t and (t+1): 
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Equation (7) highlights the consumption smoothing properties of the solution, emphasized in 
the seminal paper by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954). Equation (8) makes clear the other main 
implication of the model, that was first stressed in Friedman (1957): consumption depends on 
the present discounted value of future expected income. The interest rate plays the important 
role of converting future resources to present ones and therefore constitutes an important 
determinant of consumption. Equation (8) imposes cross equation restrictions on the joint time 
series process for income and consumption, as noted in Sargent (1978).  Equation (9) implies 
that in appraising the effects of a given policy, for instance a tax reform that affects disposable 
income, a distinction must be drawn between permanent and temporary changes (Blinder and 
Deaton, 1985,  Poterba, 1988). Another implication of (9) is that saving predicts future changes 
in income, the so-called ‘saving for a rainy day’ motive (Campbell, 1987).  
 
Quadratic utility implies certainty equivalence: the consumption function (8) is the same as 
under certainty, once expectations are replaced by realizations. This is convenient for analytical 
purposes, but clearly restrictive, for instance in its treatment of financial decisions: quadratic 
preferences imply increasing absolute risk aversion in consumption (or wealth), something that 
is unappealing on theoretical grounds and strongly counterfactual (riskier portfolios are 
normally held by wealthier households). Quadratic preferences also imply that the willingness 
to substitute over time is a decreasing function of consumption: poor consumers should react 
much more to interest rate changes than rich consumers, after allowance has been made for the 
wealth/income effect. 
 
The alternative adopted in much of the literature has been to assume power utility and to allow 
for the existence of a number of risky financial assets. Power utility, also known as iso-elastic, 











c U ; it converges to ln(C) for  1 = γ .  
  20Once one deviates from quadratic utility, however, and/or allows for stochastic interest rates, 
one loses the ability to obtain a closed form solution for consumption. Many of the studies that 
made this choice, therefore, have focussed on the Euler equations derived from the 
maximization problem faced by the consumer. The basic first order conditions used in this 
literature are: 
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where equation (11) is valid as long as the k-th asset can be freely traded by consumers. 
Equation (10) says that, at each point in time, the marginal utility of consumption equals the 
Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint relevant for that period, which is 
sometimes referred to as the marginal utility of wealth. The second condition, equation (11), 
that is derived from intertemporal optimality, dictates the evolution of the marginal utility of 
wealth. An equation of this type has to hold for each asset k for which the consumer is not at a 
corner. This is because the consumer is exploiting that particular intertemporal margin.  
 
The attractiveness of Euler equations is that one can be agnostic about the stochastic 
environment faced by the consumer, the time horizon, the possible presence of a bequest 
motive, the presence of imperfections in financial markets (as long as there is at least one asset 
that the consumer can freely trade), and the presence of frictions in other variables affecting 
utility, z. All relevant information is summarized in the level of the marginal utility of wealth. 
The approach is conceptually similar to the use of an (unobservable)  fixed effect in 
econometrics. By taking first differences, one eliminates the unobservable marginal utility of 
wealth and is left only with the innovations to equation (11). This approach has played an 
important role in the empirical analysis of the life-cycle model and we will come back to it.  
 
The derivation of a closed form solution for consumption when certainty equivalence does not 
hold is possible in the case where the utility function exhibits constant absolute risk aversion. 
Caballero (1991) shows that in a modified Flavin model (with certain finite life and CARA 
preferences) the optimal consumption age profile is flat with no uncertainty, but increasing 
with income uncertainty. This change in the slope of the consumption profile is labelled as 
  21precautionary saving, because early in life consumers save more if labour income is more 
uncertain. Later work by Gollier (1995) and Carroll and Kimball (1996) established that a 
similar result holds whenever the third derivative of the utility function is positive, and this 
feature of preferences is labelled prudence. Both CARA and power utility exhibit prudence. 
The presence and size of precautionary savings is a matter of great relevance for public policy, 
in so far as public insurance schemes covering such risks as unemployment, health and 
longevity should reduce the need for consumers to accumulate assets. 
 
The great merit of even this simple model with prudence is that it highlights the need to save 
for rainy days even if sunny days are equally important. An increased variance in the shocks to 
income reduces consumption even if expected income does not change. In the case of discrete 
variables, such as unemployment or illness, changes in first and second moments occur 
simultaneously, but this is not the case for continuous variables. The ability to distinguish 
between first and second moments effects is of crucial importance in the analysis of public 
policy, because public policy can be used to provide social insurance, by reducing the variance 
while keeping the mean constant. For instance, a revenue-neutral tax reform that cuts taxes for 
the rich may depress consumption because it induces more precautionary saving (Varian, 1980, 
stresses the insurance role of a progressive income tax).  
 
3.2.   Estimating preference parameters 
 
The Euler equation is particularly useful from an empirical point of view because it can be cast 
as a set of orthogonality conditions that should hold in a variety of situations and allows 
estimating preference parameters and testing the validity of the model without being explicit 
about all the details of the stochastic environment faced by the consumer and without having 
to solve explicitly the dynamic optimization problem for consumption or other variables jointly 
determined with consumption. As stressed by Chamberlain (1984), estimation of the Euler 
equation requires observations covering a long period of time, as the orthogonality conditions  
hold in expectation, and (but for the special case of complete markets) sample expectations 
converge to population expectations only over time (see also Hayashi, 1987). 
A version of the Euler equation holds even if the consumer chooses labour supply, durable 
consumption and many other variables that are subject to different types of adjustment costs 
and frictions. It holds under a wide variety of assumptions about the information set used by 
  22the consumer and, by the law of iterated expectations, it holds whenever the information set 
used by the econometrician is no larger than that available to the consumer. To use it, one does 
not need to specify assumptions about pension systems, future wage processes, bequests 
motives and so on and so forth. Moreover, it reflects the main essence of the life cycle model: 
the fact that consumption is chosen so to keep (discounted, expected) marginal utility constant 
over time.  
The Euler equation can be used for two purposes: testing for the validity of some of the model 
assumptions, notably the ability of consumers to save in response to changes in intertemporal 
prices, and estimating preference parameters. The first paper to estimate a consumption Euler 
equation (Hall, 1978) was entirely devoted to testing the model, but much of the literature since 
has done both.  
Hall took the case of quadratic utility and a fixed interest rate such that (1+r)β =1. Under these 
conditions, equation (6) obtains and preference parameters are not identified. Another notable 
feature of Hall’s version of the Euler equation for consumption is that it aggregates perfectly, 
because it involves linear transformations of the data, and can therefore be empirically 
implemented in micro and aggregate data alike. The Euler equation (6) implies that no variable 
known to the consumer at time t should help predict the change in consumption between t and 
(t+1) – an important and easy to test implication of the intertemporal optimization model that 
has been rejected a number of times on aggregate and micro data alike (Jappelli and Pagano, 
1989, Hall and Mishkin, 1982). 
 
The special features of the Hall’s model may explain these rejections – for this reason in the 
literature Euler equations have been estimated and tested for more general preference 
specifications. As mentioned earlier, a popular preference specification is the power utility 











c U , that has been used in the consumption literature since the 
papers by  Hansen and Singleton (1982 and 1983). Its main advantage is analytic convenience, 
as it yields first order conditions that are log-linear in consumption. However, such a 
specification also imposes strong restrictions on preferences. The elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution of consumption is, in this context, constant and equal to 1/γ. This implies that the 
degree of intertemporal substitutability of consumption is independent of the level of 
consumption, even at very low levels of consumption.  Moreover, the same parameter governs 
both the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the degree of risk aversion. This is the 
  23consequence of the assumption of intertemporal separability and separability across states of 
the world.  
Substituting equation (10) into (11) and using the properties of the power utility function the 
Euler equations for consumption corresponding to each asset (k) are: 
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Where γ is a curvature parameter (equal to the relative risk aversion parameter and to the 
reciprocal of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution) and β, the subjective discount factor,  
measures patience. Equation (12) is an orthogonality condition stating that a particular 
transformation of the data is orthogonal to the information set used by the agent.  Such a 
condition suggests naturally the use of some GMM method to estimate the unknown 
parameters and, to the extent one considers a vector of variables whose dimension is greater 
than that of the parameter to be estimated, to test the validity of the model. In essence, Hall 
(1978) was the first test, in a specific context, of this orthogonality condition.   
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where  1 + t α is a time-varying term that depends on the preference parameters γ  and β as well on 
the conditional second moment of the argument of the expected utility operator in equation 
(12).  
Estimating equation (12) seems preferable because no assumption has to be made about the 
conditional variance term, but will produce inconsistent estimates whenever there is 
measurement error in consumption. Equation (13), instead, can be consistently estimated if 
there is serially uncorrelated measurement error, as long as one can find instruments that are 
orthogonal to both the error term and the time varying intercept. Attanasio and Low (2004) 
discuss conditions under which equation (13), estimated under the assumption of a constant 
1, yields consistent estimates for the curvature parameter, γ. Notice that the other preference 
+ t α
  24parameter, the discount factor, is not identified in this framework, as it gets buried into the 
constant.
9 
Of particular importance for policy analysis is 1/γ , or elasticity of intertemporal substitution, 
that tells us how the marginal rate of substitution between today and tomorrow’s consumption 
reacts to changes in the interest rate, keeping life-time utility constant. The increase in the 
interest rate represents a decrease in the price of future consumption relative to current 
consumption, and this induces a ‘substitution effect’ of a decrease in current consumption and 
a commensurate increase in current saving. This would be counteracted by an ‘income effect’ 
since with a higher interest rate a given target level of future consumption is achieved with less 
saving. As noted by Summers (1981), wealth effects, concerning the amount that expected 
future incomes are discounted, reinforce substitution effects and also lead to a decrease in 
consumption or increase in saving when the interest rate goes up. These wealth effects tend to 
be stronger when the time period that the individual cares about is longer. Ultimately, which of 
these forces dominates depends on preference parameters and is, therefore, an empirical issue, 
that depends on the size of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. 
 
An influential paper by Hall (1988) claimed that this parameter is close to zero. This finding has 
been challenged on various grounds. A low response of consumption growth to the real 
interest rate could obtain if some consumers are liquidity constrained, or if the error term 
correlates with that part of the real interest rate that is explained by the instruments. Attanasio 
and Weber (1993, 1995) point out that aggregation bias could be responsible for such low 
estimate: the aggregate consumption growth rate is computed by taking logs of the mean of 
individual consumption, whereas equation (13) implies that means of the logs should be taken 
instead. Attanasio and Weber (1993) provide evidence that the difference between these two 
terms is highly serially correlated, thus invalidating lagged consumption growth as an 
instrument. When they correct for this they find higher estimates of the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution. Attanasio and Weber use cohort data (that is: data from repeated 
cross sections, that is consistently aggregated over individuals born in the same years): when 
they focus on cohorts of individuals who are least likely to be liquidity constrained, and control 
for changes in taste shifters, they estimate a much higher elasticity (around 0.8) using UK 
                                                 
9 Equations (12) and its log-linearized version (13) refer to an individual asset. If the consumer has access to 
several assets for which she is not at a corner, one can consider an Euler equations for each of these assets. These 
equations have been used extensively to study the implications of the model we are considering for asset pricing, 
since Lucas (1978) and Breeden (1979). 
  25(1993) and also US cohort data (1995). Recently,  Scholz, Seshadri and Khitrtrakun. (2006) 
address the issue of how well the life cycle model predicts wealth holdings, and take as 
benchmark case 1/γ = 0.33, but they also show that the model fits best when they take 1/γ  = 
0.67. In a recent, very ingenious paper, Engelhardt and Kumar (2007) use differences in 
employer’s matching rates in 401(k)s and its effect on participation to identify the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution, and obtain a point estimate of 0.74.  
  
In much of the macro literature, the iso-elastic specification has played a predominant role. 
Little attention has been paid to the possibility that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution 
may differ across consumers, particularly as a function of their consumption. A simple way to 
capture the notion that poor consumers may be less able to smooth consumption across 
periods and states of nature is to assume that the utility function does not depend on total 
(non-durable) consumption, rather on the difference between consumption and needs. Thus 
we could have retained the analytical attraction of power utility, but have (C-C*) as its 
argument, where C* is an absolute minimum that the consumer must reach in each and every 
period. This functional form is known as Stone-Geary utility in demand analysis (see Deaton 
and Muellbauer, 1980, chapter 3, for example), and is the simplest way to introduce non-
homotheticity in a demand system.
10 Attanasio and Browning (1995) take a different route and 
extend the isoelastic specification by modelling marginal utility as a quadratic function in the 
logarithm of consumption. Blundell, Browning and Meghir (1991), Atkenson and Ogaki (1996) 
and Guvenen (2006) are among the few other examples of papers that explicitly allow for 
wealth-dependent elasticity of intertemporal substitution (see also Crossley and Low, 2005).  
However, a recent paper by Battistin, Blundell and Lewbel (2009) suggests that non-durable 
consumption is log-normally distributed, and this is consistent with the standard iso-elastic 
utility specification.  
3.3. Liquidity constraints as an explanation of excess sensitivity 
 
The Euler equations (12) and (13) have been estimated mostly on aggregate data. In several 
cases, some of the model implications have been rejected: generally speaking, the error term 
has been found to correlate with information available at time t (rejection of the over-
                                                 
10  One could interpret “external habits” (Abel, 1990, Campbell and Cochrane, 1999) as a special way to 
parameterize C* (by making it a fraction of past consumption).  
 
  26identifying restrictions), and in particular with that part of income growth that could be 
explained by such information (excess sensitivity). A good example of  this type of results are 
those in the influential Campbell and Mankiw (1990 and 1991) papers, which report results 
from a regression like (13) where changes in aggregate consumption were related to changes in 
(expected – as instrumented) disposable income. The significance of the expected income 
coefficient is interpreted in that paper as a fundamental violation of the basic model, caused 
either by ‘rule of thumb’ consumers, consuming a fixed proportion of their disposable income, 
or by binding liquidity constraints. In fact, a reason why excess sensitivity or violations of the 
over-identifying restrictions may be detected is because some consumers are not able to 
borrow and lend at the same interest rate. Binding liquidity constraints may cause excess 
sensitivity if constrained individuals experience temporary income changes: they will change 
consumption by more than the intertemporal optimization problem implies. However, excess 
sensitivity may also have other explanations, as we shall see later. 
Liquidity constraints can take several forms – in the next section we shall consider market 
structures in which such constraints are the optimal response to information asymmetries or 
enforceability problems. However, much of the literature imposes such constraints 
exogenously. If, in addition to the non-bankruptcy constraint considered in the previous 
section, one imposes some exogenous and more stringent limits on the amount people can 
borrow, it is possible that consumers will be constrained in a given period and the Euler 
equation (12) will not hold. In this case, assuming a variable rate of interest Rt one would have: 
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The consumer would like to increase current consumption and therefore her current marginal 
utility is higher than in the case in which the borrowing restriction is not binding. The presence 
of a binding liquidity constraint means that the consumer is at a kink of the intertemporal 
budget constraint, so that the tangency requirement between the ratio of marginal utilities and 
intertemporal prices holds as a slack condition.  
The presence of a binding liquidity constraint represents an important issue for the empirical 
application of the Euler equation. Of course, the borrowing restriction will not be binding in 
every period and, when not binding, the Euler equation will hold. However, even in periods in 
which the liquidity constraint does not bind and the Euler equation holds, the level  of 
consumption will be affected as the consumer takes into account the possibility that the 
constraint will bind in future periods. As pointed out, for instance, by Hayashi (1987), the 
  27presence of a borrowing restriction is equivalent to a shortening of the time horizon: a 
consumer who expects to face a binding liquidity constraint n periods ahead, will plan to have 
zero wealth in that period, therefore behaving as if the planning horizon was n periods. 
11 
Notice, however, that the relationship between consumption at n-1 and n-2 is not affected, and 
the Euler equation between those two periods holds as if the liquidity constraint is not 
operative. The liquidity constraint has an effect on the level of consumption even when is not 
binding.  In addition to the extreme case of an exogenously given borrowing limit, one can 
consider alternative borrowing restrictions. For instance, it is possible to consider the case of a 
difference between borrowing and lending interest rates, or more generally, the case in which 
the interest rate varies with the position of the consumer in a given asset, typically increasing 
with higher levels of debts. These cases have been studied, for instance, by Pissarides (1978) 
and Juster and Shay (1964). 
A direct way to detect binding constraints is to ask consumers whether they applied for and 
were denied credit. Jappelli, (1990) reports that 12.5% of the 1982 wave of the SCF 
respondents answered they were denied credit, and models the probability of credit denial as a 
function of observable characteristics. The problem with this type of question is that 
consumers may have been denied credit for good reasons (likely violation of the no-bankruptcy 
condition), or may have decided not to apply for credit on the assumption that this would be 
refused to them (a discouraged borrower effect).  
Less direct tests for liquidity constraints that meet these criticisms are based on the idea that 
the Euler equation should be violated for groups of consumers who are likely to be 
constrained, such as the young and those whose liquid assets are particularly low. This strategy 
was implemented by Zeldes (1989) using the ratio of liquid assets to income at time t as an 
indicator of potential constraints. Zeldes reports evidence for liquidity constraints among 
households with very low liquid assets: for this group consumption growth would rise by 4% if 
the constraint were relaxed. However, any sample split based on choice variables may induce 
endogenous selection, particularly if the error term reflects preference heterogeneity.  
For this reason, other papers have followed a different route, that works whenever the amount 
borrowed depends on other variables, such as earnings (see Alessie, Melenberg and Weber, 
1989, and Weber, 1993) or collateral (such as in the case of durables, Brugiavini and Weber, 
                                                 
11 Deaton (1991), simulating a stationary economy with impatient consumers and precautionary saving, shows that 
liquidity constraints are rarely binding 
 
  281994, Alessie, Devereux and Weber, 1997, and Chah, Ramey and Starr,  1995). In this case the 
presence of a binding borrowing restriction distorts not only the intertemporal margin but also 
the allocation of resources between different commodities (or leisure and consumption) within 
a period. Alessie, Devereux and Weber note that identification of liquidity constraints is greatly 
enhanced if the relationship between the borrowing limit and the choice variable is exogenously 
changed within the sample period (this is true in their analysis of cars and non-durable 
expenditure, because the hire-purchase terms were heavily regulated by the UK government 
over the first part of the sample period, completely unregulated later). They do find evidence of 
binding liquidity constraints in some of the years prior to financial liberalisation, but only for 
young consumers. Finally, a test for liquidity constraints that compares the first order 
conditions across periods to the first order conditions across goods is proposed by Meghir and 
Weber (1996) – their results suggest liquidity constraints may be binding only for young 
consumers.
12 
Despite all these different approaches, the most widely cited piece of evidence for the 
operation of liquidity constraints is “excess sensitivity”. But excess sensitivity of consumption 
to income (both at low and high frequency) may be due to incorrect preference specification, as 
we argue in the next section.  
3.4. Explaining income tracking and the retirement consumption drop 
 
An influential paper by Carroll and Summers (1991) uses micro data to document ‘excess 
sensitivity’ of consumption to income. The authors notice not only that the life cycle profiles of 
income and consumption track each other, but that the shape of the two profiles co-vary across 
different groups in the population. For instance, households headed by an individual with low 
education have a relatively flat profile for both income and consumption, while households 
headed by better educated individuals present more of a hump shape.  This evidence has been 
                                                 
12 A problem with all Euler equations-based tests as well as with the direct question is that, as Hayashi (1987) 
explains, the presence of an operative, albeit not binding liquidity constraint is equivalent to a shortening of the 
planning horizon. This may be the relevant information that is needed for policy purposes. Evidence on this can 
be obtained by noting that consumers that are liquidity constraints will not be sensitive to changes in the level of 
the interest rate. As they will be at a kink of an intertemporal budget constraint, the demand for loans will be 
inelastic to changes in the slope of such an intertemporal budget constraint: the interest rate. This approach has 
been followed by Juster and Shay (1965) and Attanasio, Goldberg and Kyriazidou (2008). Interest rate elasticities 
of credit demand have been estimated by Gross and Souleles (2002) using US credit card data, and by Alessie, 
Hochguertel and Weber (2005) using Italian instalment credit data.  
 
  29used to argue that consumers are impatient but prudent, to the point of holding liquid assets to 
buffer shocks – this has come to be known as the buffer-stock model of savings.  
The different results mentioned above are reminiscent of the early debate between Thurow 
(1969) and Heckman (1974). The former pointed to the covariance over the life cycle between 
income and consumption as a rejection of the life cycle model, while the latter replied that a 
version of the life cycle model where consumption and leisure were not separable could well 
explain such a covariance. The micro papers cited above show that consistent with Heckman 
(1974)’s argument, excess sensitivity can be reconciled with the intertemporal optimization 
model if more general, and sensible, utility functions are used. In particular, if one assumes that 
leisure affects utility in a non-additive way, consumption changes respond to predictable labour 
income changes, whether or not leisure is a freely chosen variable.  
Micro data equations typically show the need to take account of the effects of some time-
varying characteristics on preferences: demographics and leisure. A way to introduce this 
dependence is to specify period-t utility as: 















                                                                                (15) 
where Z contains hours of work, and other taste shifters (Attanasio and Weber, 1993 and 
1995), some of which might be unobservable.
13  If one takes the model to micro data one has 
to allow for the effect that demographic variables have on utility. The fact that ‘when you have 
a wife and a baby a onepenny bun costs three pence’ (Gorman) has to be taken into account if 
one estimates the model on micro data. Demographics might explain consumption changes as 
well as the shape of the consumption age profile, as argued by Browning and Ejrnaes (2002). 
The increase in household size early in life, and decrease past age fifty, can explain why 
consumption age profiles are hump-shaped, in apparent contradiction of the consumption 
smoothing implications of the life-cycle theory. The interaction between demographics and 
prudence explains instead why the peak in consumption occurs later in life than the peak in 
household size and can generate consumption-income tracking for four different education 
groups when labour income is uncertain, as shown in Attanasio, Banks, Meghir and Weber 
(1999).  
                                                 
13 Leisure has also been introduced in the utility function in some papers that use aggregate data, such as Mankiw, 
Rotemberg and Summers (1985), and Bean (1986).  
 
  30More general preference structures, that allow the elasticity of intertemporal substitution to 
depend also on current consumption, have been considered in the empirical literature, 
(Attanasio and Browning, 1993, Blundell, Browning and Meghir, 1994, Attanasio and Weber, 
1995, Meghir and Weber, 1996). As in the standard case, the parameters of these specifications 
can be estimated using the Euler equations and other first order conditions of the optimization 
problem faced by the consumer.  
The results obtained in the papers that use the Euler equation to estimate preference 
parameters and test the model could be summarized by saying that a flexible version of the life 
cycle model is not rejected by individual level data, especially if one focuses on households 
headed by prime aged individuals, that is, excluding very young households and households on 
the verge of or passed the retirement age. Typically, there is no excess sensitivity of 
consumption growth to income growth once changes in leisure and demographics are taken 
into account.  
These results show that it is possible to find a specification of preferences that is not 
inconsistent with the available micro data. However, leisure and demographics variables could 
capture the essence of the predictability of income and make the estimates of the ‘excess 
sensitivity’ parameter imprecise. Such variables, according to this interpretation, therefore 
should not be interpreted as ‘taste shifters’. There are two possible answers to this objection. 
First, a ‘horse race’ between expected income and these other variables seems to indicate that 
the introduction of the latter does not just inflate the standard error, but also reduces the size 
of the income coefficient. Second, once one has estimated the life cycle model augmented with 
these additional variables, one should ask whether the implied preferences are sensible and 
predict features of the data that were not used to estimate them. We will come back to this 
issue below. 
Finally, aggregation issues have been proven to be important. As pointed out in Attanasio and 
Weber (1993), the difference between the consistently aggregated equation (based on the means 
of the logarithm of consumption) and what is available in macro data (the logarithm of the 
mean) is a highly persistent process that correlates with lagged information. Attanasio and 
Weber (1993) also show that results obtained with improperly aggregated micro data are 
consistent with results obtained with aggregate data and indicate rejections of the model that 
instead disappear with properly aggregated data and rich enough preference structures.  
 
  31In models where utility depends on the consumption of several goods and leisure, one can 
explicitly allow for home production of goods and services (Becker, 1965 and 1981; Ghez and 
Becker, 1975). This has been recently emphasized in connection with changes in spending 
behaviour around retirement (Aguiar and Hurst, 2005). The availability of time-use data allows 
testing for the implications of the model in terms of changes of the composition of 
consumption over the life-cycle (Aguiar and Hurst, 2007 and 2009).  
 
A number of recent papers have estimated the effects on changes in consumption of well-
defined predictable tax changes (such as tax rebates, social security withholding tax), often 
finding these effects to be different from zero (Parker, 1999, Souleles, 1999, Shapiro and 
Slemrod, 2003, Johnson, Parker and Souleles, 2006). This violation of the model predictions is 
surprising, because consumption does not appear to react to other anticipated income changes 
(Browning and Collado, 2003, Hsieh, 2003).  
The evidence of these “natural experiment” papers suggests that consumption reacts to 
predicted changes in disposable income only to the extent that these changes are relatively 
small, as noted by Browning and Crossley (2007), because small optimization errors might have 
trivial  utility costs (Cochrane, 1989).  
A number of recent papers report evidence in favour of a liquidity constraints interpretation. 
Stephens (2008) shows that consumption reacts to the repayment of vehicle loans, and this is 
particularly true for young individuals, who are more likely in principle to be liquidity 
constrained. Agarwal, Liu and Souleles (2007) investigate credit cardholders’ response to the 
2001 tax rebates and find that most people first increased repayments, but then the young and 
those who were initially close to their credit card limit started spending more (and building up 
debt faster). The eventual rise in spending could then be attributed to the operation of liquidity 
constraints. Similarly, Hsieh, Shimizutani and Hori (2008) find that Japanese consumers’ 
response to a spending coupon program tailored to families with children and the elderly was 
highest among those with low wealth.   
 
Another piece of evidence that apparently contradicts the life cycle model is the retirement 
consumption puzzle. The simple life-cycle model of Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) predicts 
that individuals save during their working lives to keep their consumption level constant once 
they retire. Hamermesh (1984) was the first paper to argue that consumers apparently do not 
  32save enough to achieve this aim. If households enter retirement with inadequate savings, they 
must cut their consumption level, contrary to the life-cycle model predictions. 
The recent literature has focused on estimating how consumption levels change around 
retirement. The existence of a consumption fall around retirement is documented for the UK 
(Banks, Blundell and Tanner, 1998), for the US (Bernheim, Skinner and Weinberg, 2001), and 
for Italy (Battistin, Brugiavini, Rettore and Weber, 2009) and is known as the retirement 
consumption puzzle (or retirement savings puzzle). 
Banks, Blundell and Tanner use British cohort data and show that the standard Euler equation, 
in which consumption growth is a function of intertemporal prices and changes in 
demographics, over-predicts the level of consumption by as much as 1.5% on an annual basis 
for ages between 60 and 67. The cumulated consumption shortfall over this age band, where 
most people retire, is around 10%. They argue that only a fraction of this drop can be 
attributed to the increased leisure time that accompanies retirement. Later work by Smith 
(2006) uses information on food for UK households who retired over the sample period, and 
stresses the importance of distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary retirement: a 
significant drop for food consumption is observed only for those who retire early because of 
poor health or job loss. Indeed, David M. Blau (2008) stresses that consumption drops at 
retirement can be reconciled with life-time optimization if there is uncertainty over layoffs, job 
offers, health and mortality, and retirement is a discrete event that is freely chosen by the 
household. However, in Blau’s model the causal effect of retirement on consumption is zero. 
Bernheim, Skinner and Weinberg use PSID data to estimate Euler equations for food 
consumption. The retirement status is instrumented by taking age-specific predicted 
probabilities conditional on demographics. The sample is split in groups: low wealth-to-income 
households drop their consumption most. BSW estimate a median drop of 14%, but higher 
drops for low wealth ratio, low income replacement households. BSW conclude that "31% of 
the sample reduce their consumption by at least 35 percentage points". The evidence they 
provide is consistent with the notion that consumers do indeed enter retirement with 
inadequate savings. A number of papers have further investigated the issue on US data - Haider 
and Stephens (2007), who estimate a smaller consumption drop for those who retire at the 
expected time; Fisher, Johnson, Marchand and Smeeding (2005), who use CEX data, deflate 
expenditure by the squared root of household size, and estimate a smaller drop (around 2.5%) 
for total expenditure than for food consumption (around 5.7%). 
  33Recent papers by Aguiar and Hurst (2005 and 2007) and Hurd and Rohwedder (2006) stress 
that the drop in expenditure at retirement does not necessarily imply an increase in the 
marginal utility of consumption. For instance, worker-related expenditure (transport to and 
from work, canteen meals and business clothing) is no longer needed - whether they account 
for a large enough part of pre-retirement consumption is an open issue. Also, home production 
of services (laundry, gardening, house-cleaning, cooking) may become advantageous, and the 
extra leisure time may allow consumers to shop more efficiently. This last channel has recently 
been stressed by Aguiar and Hurst (2005 and 2007) in their careful analysis of food 
consumption around retirement, whilst the increase in home production of services by recent 
retirees has been documented by Hurd and Rohwedder (2006), who exploit time-use data. The 
literature has investigated as further reasons for this drop unexpectedly low pensions or 
liquidity problems as well as time-inconsistent behaviour (Angeletos, Laibson, Repetto, 
Tobacman and Weinberg., 2001). Another recent paper by Aguila, Attanasio and Meghir (2010) 
that looks at changes in consumption around retirement (using the longitudinal dimension of 
the CEX in the US) find that the decline in food expenditure is compensated by increases in 
non food items, so that the total is roughly constant.  
Battistin, Brugiavini, Rettore and Weber (2009) use Italian data and instrument retirement with 
public pension eligibility. To be more precise, they take a regression discontinuity approach, 
and make the identifying assumption that spending behaviour would be smooth around the 
threshold for pension eligibility if individuals did not retire. They estimate at 9.8 percent the 
part of the non-durable consumption drop that is associated with retirement induced by 
eligibility (food expenditure falls instead by 14%). They show that this fall is not driven by 
liquidity problems for the less well off in the population, and can be accounted for by drops in 
expenses that are work-related or leisure substitutes. However, they also show that retirement 
induces a significant drop in the number of grown children living with their parents, and this 
can account for most of the retirement consumption drop.
14 
As Hurst (2008) recently put it, we should no longer talk about the retirement consumption 
puzzle, rather about “the retirement of a consumption puzzle”. Once preferences are correctly 
modelled, home production is taken into account, and attention is focussed on those who retire 
                                                 
14 A few recent papers study how different expenditure items vary over the life-cycle and in relation to leisure. 
Miniaci, Monfardini and Weber (2002 and 2009) focus on changes around retirement age, while Aguiar and Hurst 
(2009) look at the evolution of work-related expenses over the whole life-cycle. This last paper claims that, once 
allowance is made for the effect of changes in family size and composition, all the decline in consumption can 
indeed be attributed to the fall in work-related expenses.  
  34at the expected age, then the drop in food spending and total spending around retirement does 
not imply a violation of the model prediction that consumers smooth marginal utility over time.   
3.5. Evidence from the levels of consumption  
 
Although consumption (growth) appears on the left hand side of equation (13), that is not a 
consumption function, but an equilibrium condition. It cannot explain/predict consumption 
levels, even conditional on current consumption: consumption is crucially determined by the 
residual term   and there is nothing in equation (13) that tells us what determines such a 
term or how it changes with news about income, interest rates or any other relevant variable, 
including future ones. This inability to predict how consumption moves in response to changes 
in the economic environment is the price one pays if one stays within the remit of the Euler 
equation. What is bought in terms of robustness is paid in terms of the non-availability of a 
consumption function.   
k
t 1 + ε
 
As stressed above, the Euler equation imposes some restrictions on the dynamics of 
consumption but, on its own, does not determine the level of consumption. Neglecting 
numerical complications, a solution for consumption can be obtained considering jointly the 
Euler equation and the sequence of budget constraints faced by the consumer as well as her 
initial wealth and a terminal condition. As noted by Sargent (1978), Flavin (1981) and later by 
Campbell (1987), the Euler equation and the intertemporal budget constraint imply a number of 
cross-equation restrictions for the joint time series processes of consumption and income. 
When one is able to obtain a closed form solution for consumption, as is the case with 
quadratic utility, these restrictions can be easily expressed in terms of a linear time series model 
and tested.  
To be more specific, given an intertemporal budget constraint that assumes a fixed interest rate 
and a relatively general process for labour earnings, with quadratic utility, the level of 
consumption is given by equation (8). Given an assumption on the time series process for 
income, this equation  will imply cross equation restrictions on the bi-variate time series model 
for consumption and earnings. Some of these restrictions are implied by the Euler equation, 
while others are not. In particular, the restrictions on the contemporaneous correlation 
between income and consumption are not: as we stressed above, the Euler equation is silent 
about how news about income are translated into news about consumption.   
  35To consider a specific example let us assume a simple AR representation for labour income: 
t t a y L A ζ + = ) ( , where A(L) denotes a polynomial in the lag operator. In this case, equation 
(8) implies (Flavin, 1981) that   
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This relation provides a link between the variance of the income shock,  , and the variance in 
the error term of the Euler equation, 
1 + t ζ
1 + t ε . If there is enough persistence in income growth 
(positive serial correlation in the first differenced process), then (16) implies that  1 1 + + = Δ t t C ζ ψ  
with   ψ>1, and consumption growth should vary more than income growth over time.  
Notice that the conditioning set for the expectations about future earnings in equation (8) is 
left unspecified. An advantage of the approach pursued here is that one can then condition 
equation (8) (and the corresponding equation for earnings) on a smaller information set, and 
obtain a similar expression. This implies that the approach is robust to the presence of an 
informational advantage of the consumer over the econometrician. The reason is that, by 
looking at consumption, we are implicitly using the information the consumers has at her 
disposal.  
If we follow Campbell (1987) and define saving as: 
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we can re-write (16) as:  
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Equation (18) shows that individuals should “save for rainy days” (future income falls), and 
holds (by the law of iterated projections) even if we take expectations conditional on a subset 
of the information used by economic agents, such as past income and saving.  
While Flavin (1981) and Campbell (1987) test the cross equation restriction that arise in the 
quadratic utility case in the VAR representation of income and consumption, Campbell and 
Deaton (1989) and West (1988) use the same structure to propose a test that links the 
innovation to permanent income to consumption. These authors present evidence that 
aggregate consumption is ‘excessively smooth’ in that it does not react enough to news about 
income. In particular, because the model for earnings seems to be characterized by a unit root 
and some additional persistence in the first changes, the model would imply that consumption 
  36changes should reflect the permanent income innovation more than one-to-one.  Not only is 
the income shock permanent, but it also predicts future, smaller shocks of the same sign. This 
implies that over the business cycle consumption should be more volatile than income. But in 
actual aggregate data consumption is smoother than income.   
By taking the intertemporal budget constraint as a given, Campbell and Deaton (1989) make a 
connection between excess sensitivity and excess smoothness.  Hansen, Roberds and Sargent 
(1991) propose a test of the intertemporal budget constraint (given the martingale behaviour of 
consumption implied by the Euler equation) that is shown to be similar to the Campbell and 
Deaton (1989) and West (1988) tests. Hansen, Roberds and Sargent (1991) clarify what the 
restrictions implied by the intertemporal budget constraint are and what restrictions can be 
tested with time series data. They also consider a number of generalizations, such as habits and 
other forms of non separabilities. When discussing endogenous liquidity constraints below, we 
argue that the test of the intertemporal budget constraint that Hansen, Roberds and Sargent 
propose can be interpreted as a test of market structure.  
  
In situations where preferences are not restricted to functional forms that admit a closed form 
solution and one considers more realistic environments, one has to rely on numerical methods 
to get the consumption function, as shown in the seminal paper by Deaton (1991). We discuss 
the literature on numerical solutions and simulations of the life cycle model in the next 
subsection.  
A less ambitious but potentially profitable approach, that does not require numerical methods 
or incredibly rich data sets, is the estimation of reduced form equations, whose specification is 
informed by the life-cycle model. These are particularly useful in situations in which one 
analyzes large (and possibly exogenous) changes to some of the likely determinants of 
consumption or saving. Such studies can address substantive issues and even test some aspects 
of the life cycle model. Examples of studies of this kind include the reaction of consumption 
(and saving) to changes in pension entitlements (Attanasio and Brugiavini, 2003, Attanasio and 
Rohwedder, 2003, Miniaci and Weber, 1999), to swings in the value of important wealth 
components (such as housing, Attanasio and Weber 1994) and to changes in specific taxes, as 
discussed above.  
 
  373.6. Simulation results 
 
A small literature has developed that numerically solves and simulates the intertemporal 
consumer problem under uncertainty, starting with an influential contribution by Deaton 
(1991), who studied a model with power utility and infinite life. Deaton considers the existence 
of liquidity constraints, and shows that impatient consumers hold limited assets to insure 
against low income draws. Carroll (1992) instead covers the case of finite lives, and shows that 
if consumers are sufficiently impatient and their labour income is subject to both permanent 
and temporary shocks, they set consumption close to income, at least until they are in their 
forties. The model with impatient consumers under labour income uncertainty has been 
labelled “the buffer stock model”, because saving is kept to the lowest level compatible with 
the need to buffer negative income shocks. Carroll’s buffer stock model can provide a rationale 
for the income tracking of consumption that was highlighted by Carroll and Summers (1991).  
Later work by Attanasio, Banks, Meghir and Weber(1999) – refined by Gourinchas and Parker 
(2002) - clarifies the role played by age-related changes in demographics and the hump-shaped 
age profile of labour income in generating income tracking for relatively young consumers (as 
mentioned above, micro data show that financial asset accumulation starts in mid-life). 
Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1994 and 1995) show instead how precautionary motives 
interact with the insurance properties of social security in the US. 
Attanasio, Banks, Meghir and Weber (1999) is the only paper that thoroughly investigates the 
interaction between demographics and precautionary savings. It does it for four different 
education groups – in the analysis education matters because income and demographics age 
profiles are education specific, and because education can affect patience. Note that it imposes 
that life ends with certainty at age 70 – it does not let the discount factor change with survival 
probabilities. Survival probabilities can play an important role in determining the shape of the 

































































Figure 4 Simulated mean consumption age profiles for high-school graduates  
 
To illustrate the interplay of demographics and uncertainty in shaping the consumption age 
profile, let us consider one of the figures in Attanasio, Banks, Meghir and Weber (1999), that 
presents the average of a large number of simulated consumption profiles for a specific 
education group in the US (high school graduates). In Figure 4, NW panel, we plot average 
consumption age profile simulations corresponding to the solution for the case where there is 
income uncertainty and demographics evolve with age (“baseline”). Counterfactual simulations 
shed light on the role of demographics and uncertainty: in the NE panel, there is income 
uncertainty but demographics do not change with age; in the SW panel, there is no income 
uncertainty and demographics evolve with age. Finally, the SE panel presents the previous 
three curves together.  
The key conclusion drawn from this and similar pictures for other education groups is that 
precautionary savings alone would imply a peak in consumption quite late in life, while 
demographic needs would make consumption peak relatively early. It is the interplay of these 
two opposing forces that generates a peak in the early to mid-forties, as observed in the data. 
  39Simulation results are also useful to study how consumption reacts to changes in the interest 
rate, an important topic for both monetary and fiscal policies.  It is well known that changes in 
the interest rate have both substitution and income effects on consumption, going in opposite 
directions for a net saver. Summers (1981) stresses the role played by the wealth effect that is 
induced by applying different discount factors to future flows of labour income. Which of 
these effects prevails depends on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution as well as on other 
factors affecting preferences. 
15  
With the isoelastic preferences discussed above, in a two period model, if γ > 1  the income 
effect prevails on the substitution effects so that an increase in the interest rate causes current 
consumption to increase. When γ < 1, instead, the substitution effect prevails and current 
consumption decreases. While these effects are quite clear in a simple model, their 
quantification in a multi-period framework, in which preferences are affected by a variety of 
factors which are possibly changing over time, is not simple. The effect of changes in the 
interest rate will depend not only on standard preferences parameters such as the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution and the discount rate but also on their interaction with the evolution 
of needs, on the shape of the income profile, on the institutional arrangements for pensions 
and so on and so forth.  
To gain a better understanding of how these various factors interact and determine the final 
effect there is little alternative to using  numerical methods that solve the model and simulate 
life cycle trajectories for a large number of hypothetical consumers to obtain average life cycle 
profiles for different sets of parameters and different interest rates. These types of exercises are 
certainly not novel. Summers (1981) and Evans (1983), for instance, present simulation results 
to characterize the interest rate elasticity of savings. Over the last 15 years, however, the 
literature on the solution of a life cycle model under uncertainty has made great progress, so 
that we are now able to solve and simulate realistic and much more sophisticated models under 
uncertainty. These models normally use parameter values from the empirical studies that have 
estimated preferences from micro data, possibly using Euler equations that are robust to the 
exact specification of the stochastic environment faced by consumers. 
Attanasio and Wakefield (2008) simulate a life cycle model to understand the importance of the 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution to determine the size of the reaction of savings to 
changes in the interest rate. They first simulate a model of a single consumer with an isoelastic  
                                                 
15 Summers (1981) claims that both for the wealth effect and for general equilibrium effects the interest rate 
elasticity of saving is bound to be high. Evans (1983) provides several counterexamples to this claim  
  40utility function (they take the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, EIS, 1/γ =1 as baseline), 
no bequest motive and a stochastic income process calibrated on UK data. Figure 5, which is 
taken from their paper, plots the changes in the life cycle asset profile induced by a change in 
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Figure 5 Average change in asset holdings by age when r changes 
 
First of all notice how, in all cases, the effect of the interest rate on savings depends on age. 
One of the implications for the aggregate effects of certain policy changes will depend on the 
demographic composition of the population. Second, notice that the increase induced by 
interest rate changes is considerably larger in the baseline case when the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution is 1 (and the discount rate is 0.025).   When the elasticity of 

























































Figure 6 Average change in assets by age when r changes, with & without family 
 
Figure 6 introduces changing needs over the life cycle (for the baseline case where the EIS is 
unity). These are calibrated using standard adult equivalent schemes and actual UK data. Utility 
depends not on total consumption but on consumption per adult equivalent. Notice how the 
effect of a change in interest rate on saving is reduced, even with an elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution left at the relatively high level of one. Other papers, such as Attanasio and Weber 
(1993), Attanasio and Browning (1995), stressed the importance of demographics to explain 
observed patterns of consumption life cycle profiles and to fit the life cycle model to the data. 
Figure 6 makes the additional point that the evolution of consumption needs also affects the 
way consumers respond to changes in intertemporal prices.
16    
As the age of household members and family composition evolves, the effect that a given level 
of consumption has on utility obviously changes. In a sense family composition variables play a 
role in the dynamic allocation of resources which is analogous to the discount factor and, as 
they vary dramatically over time, can have quantitatively important implications for the level 
and shape of asset life cycle profiles.
17 Moreover, as we mentioned above, their evolution 
interacts with preferences to determine the response to specific changes in the environment.    
 
 
                                                 
16 In both figures 5 and 6 the change in assets is normalised by dividing through by expected income at age 21. 
17 Evans (1983) stresses that differences in discount factors can alter both the shape of asset life cycle profiles and 
the way in which they respond to changes in the interest rate. This is also discussed by Gruber (2006)  
  424.    Budget constraints and markets: theory and evidence  
 
The implications of any model of intertemporal consumption behaviour depend heavily on the 
nature of market arrangements through which the agents considered in the model interact and 
on the type of intertemporal trades agents have access to. This is especially true for the life 
cycle model. As the focus of the life cycle model is the intertemporal allocation of resources (in 
an uncertain environment), insurance and credit markets are particularly important.  
What is often considered the standard version of the life cycle-permanent income model, such 
as the one we used above to derive Euler equations, makes some stark assumptions about the 
nature of intertemporal trades available to agents. Typically, state contingent trades are ignored 
(hence ruling out insurance) and often the consumer considered in the model is only endowed 
with a single asset that pays a known and fixed interest rate. On the other hand, this consumer 
might be allowed to borrow or save without limits (except for a non-bankruptcy constraint). 
Obviously all these assumptions are very extreme and unrealistic. It is therefore important to 
consider explicitly several alternative market structures. In what follows, we stress how 
different markets structures might have only limited implications for some of the results 
typically used in the literature (in particular Euler equations), and how they have important 
implications for the level of consumption and for its relationship to current income.  
We do not discuss the portfolio problems implied by the consideration of several assets 
simultaneously or the implications that can be derived from the theory for asset pricing. Instead 
we focus on the implications of different market structures for the intertemporal allocation of 
consumption.
18 In particular, we consider four different structures. The first, which constitutes 
a useful, albeit unrealistic, benchmark, is the case in which the consumer is assumed to have 
access to a full set of state-contingent Arrow-Debreu securities. The second is the standard 
case, considered above, in which the consumer is endowed with an exogenously given 
technology to move resources into and from the future at a given rate. We then move on to 
introduce some specific limits to the intertemporal trades available to consumers, not only in 
terms of the type of securities available to them, but also, more specifically, in terms of the 
amount of resources that can be moved from the future. This is what is normally referred to as 
                                                 
18 From a theoretical point of view, the consideration of several assets, some of which might have state contingent 
returns, and others for which several restrictions are relevant, can be easily added to the model. A useful result in 
this respect is the fact that as long as the consumer is not a corner for a given asset, one can write down an Euler 
equation for that particular asset, linking consumption at two points in time. This is true regardless of the presence 
of imperfections and frictions in other markets.  
 
  43‘liquidity constraints’. Finally, we consider situations where, rather than being imposed 
exogenously, specific limits to intertemporal trades arise endogenously from the presence of 
specific imperfections.    
4.1. Complete Markets 
 
In this benchmark case, it is assumed that consumers have access to state contingent securities 
that pay a certain amount of consumption, which depends on the particular state of the world 
that is realized at a given time. The implicit assumption behind this framework is that very 
complex contracts can be written and supported by a completely symmetric information 
structure among consumers and then enforced perfectly.  
The stochastic environment in which agents live can be summarized by a vector of state 
variables  t θ . We will denote with  the history of the state variables up to time t .  
We also assume that the sets  of all possible histories up to time t are endowed with a certain 
probability measure. We write as   the probability of history  . The consumer receives 
resources   that depend on the history of the state variables at time t. The consumer problem 
can be written as: 
} ,... , { 2 1 t
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where   is the price of consumption at time t   at history  .  To compute the 
equilibrium that would prevail in such a situation, one has to consider the problem (19) for 
each consumer in the economy. The specific type of competitive equilibrium that would prevail 
will depend on the specifics of individual preferences, income processes and, possibly, initial 
endowments. The computation of this type of equilibrium is in principle very complex. 
However, the literature provides some important results that allow one to characterize some 




In particular, one can exploit the fact that, in the absence of externalities and other distortions, 
competitive equilibrium allocations are Pareto efficient and invoke the first Welfare theorem to 
describe them as the result of the optimization problem faced by a fictitious social planner that 
maximizes the weighted average of individual utilities. While the theory is silent about the 
weights used in this problem (that is on the particular competitive equilibrium that is realized), 
  44the study of this problem is useful in characterizing the intertemporal consumption allocations. 
If we assume that the social planner has a technology to transfer aggregate resources to and 
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where index i refers to individuals,  i φ  is the Pareto weight given to individual i,  is the 
asset available to society to move resources over time.  The social planner achieves a given 
intrapersonal and intertemporal consumption allocation by a set of transfers among the agents. 
Notice that in this formulation the presence of individual savings is not necessary. The social 
planner could achieve any given allocation implied by a certain amount of individual savings 
without them and via different sets of interpersonal transfers. The problem in (20) assumes the 
possibility of aggregate borrowing and the existence of a fixed rate at which resources can be 
moved over time. Moreover, it also assumes that individuals have homogeneous preferences 
and discount factors. These assumptions can be relaxed. It is also possible to use more general 
forms of preferences incorporating, for instance, leisure.   
1 + t A
From the first order conditions of problem (20), one can derive some interesting relationships. 
In particular, one set of first order conditions will be: 
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Equation (21) states that the marginal utility of consumption for individual i, at a given state of 
the world at time t, multiplied by her Pareto weight, is equal to the aggregate constraint 
multiplier relevant in that state of the world (divided by the probability of that particular 
history).  
Notice that the right-hand side of equation (21) does not depend on the index i. This implies 
that consumption for each individual has to be such that the (discounted) marginal utility 
multiplied by that person’s Pareto weight has to be equal to the right-hand side of equation 
(21). This implication of perfect risk-sharing means that idiosyncratic risk is diversified and only 
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consumption levels if Pareto weights are different, but over time the cross section of 
consumption moves to guarantee that (21) holds for each individual.  
An important possible implication of the complete markets, full insurance model is that it 
allows the construction of a ‘representative’ consumer. That is, an important aggregation 
theorem holds under the hypothesis that markets are complete and idiosyncratic risk is fully 
diversified. Aggregate consumption moves as if it was determined by a representative consumer 
who acts according to the life cycle model subject to an intertemporal budget constraint similar 
to that in equation (20). This result holds, as showed, for instance, by Townsend (1994), even 
in the presence of heterogeneous preferences (see also Atkeson and Ogaki, 1996). The 
preferences of the representative consumer will aggregate individual preferences. 
Equation (21) has constituted the basis for much of the empirical tests of perfect insurance. 
Log linearizing (21) and taking first differences one obtains the simple proposition that changes 
in marginal utility of consumption should be the same in a cross section of consumers who 
share risk efficiently  
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With a specific assumption about the utility function it is easy to derive from equation (22) an 
expression that can be brought to data. For instance, with CRRA utility, one gets:  
                                                                                              (23)  t
i
t C ν β γ + − = Δ ) ln( ) ln(
Notice that the left-hand side is individual consumption growth, while on the right hand side 
we only have aggregate variables, that is quantities that do not vary in the cross section.
19  A 
possible test of perfect risk sharing, therefore is to add to equation (23) a variable related to the 
change in resources accruing to household i  in period t and test the significance of such a 
coefficient. 
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where y could be household income, or wages, the term  t ν , the multiplier on the aggregate 
resources constraint, can be captured by time dummies and   represents a regression 
residual. The test of perfect risk sharing, therefore, will be that the coefficient φ = 0. It is worth 
noting that equation (22), and therefore (23), holds without error as perfect insurance assumes 
the possibility of writing contracts that determine the allocation of resources under any possible 
i
t ε
                                                 
19 In this example we do not consider preference heterogeneity (for example in discount factors). Townsend 
(1994) discusses cases with heterogeneity in risk attitudes.  
  46state of the world. The presence of a residual in equation (24), therefore, has to be justified by 
measurement error in either consumption or y. In the latter case, however, one has to take into 
account the fact that estimates of φ will be affected by attenuation bias. 
This implication of perfect risk sharing, first noticed by Townsend (1994) and tested for the US 
by Cochrane (1991) and Mace (1991) is very powerful and the empirical tests that can be 
derived from it very appealing.
20 From a theoretical point of view it captures the fundamental 
idea of risk sharing, that is that risk is pooled efficiently among the participants in a risk sharing 
agreement. From an empirical point of view, the strategy proposed by Townsend (1994) is 
appealing because it allows one to test efficient risk sharing without specifying the entire budget 
constraint relevant for the individual agents. Agents may use a host of different instruments to 
achieve efficient intertemporal allocations, including a variety of privately held assets, informal 
interpersonal transfers, implicit contracts and so on. The Townsend (1994) test looks at the 
actual allocation of resources, regardless of how it was achieved.  
 
Townsend (1994) applies his test to 3 Indian villages and finds some important rejections of 
full risk sharing. Cochrane (1991) and Mace (1991), instead, use US data and test the 
implications of equation (23) using different specifications for the utility function. Cochrane 
(1991) shows that the growth rates of food consumption do not respond to some shocks (such 
as strikes, or involuntary moves), but are affected by involuntary job loss and long illness. 
Perhaps surprisingly, Mace (1991) does not reject the hypothesis of full risk sharing. It has been 
pointed out, however, that her results could be due to measurement error (see Nelson, 1994).  
Strong rejections of the perfect insurance hypothesis, instead, are reported by both Hayashi, 
Altonji and Kotlikoff (1996), and Attanasio and Davis (1996). Attanasio and Davis (1996), in 
particular, show that while short run changes in relative male wages (across education and 
cohort groups) do not seem to be related to changes in relative consumption, when one 
considers lower frequencies, one finds significant effects. 
21   
An alternative test of perfect insurance can be obtained by looking at the evolution of cross 
sectional second moments. Considering again the log-linearization of equation (21) one can 
easily obtain the result that the cross sectional variance of the log of marginal utilities should be 
                                                 
20 Altug and Miller (1990) estimate and test a model of household consumption and labour supply choices with 
complete markets.  
21 Hayashi, Altonji and Kotlikoff (1996) use food consumption data from PSID to test for complete risk-sharing 
across all households and across households that belong to the same family (dynasty): in both cases they reject the 
null of complete risk-sharing. 
  47constant over time, under perfect risk sharing, a fact first noted by Deaton and Paxson (1994). 
Deaton and Paxson (1994) stress the fact that, in many countries, the life cycle profile of 
consumption inequality seems to be increasing with age, a fact that is consistent with simple 
versions of the life cycle model with a single asset, but not with complete markets.  Since that 
contribution, other papers have tested this implication (see for instance Attanasio and Jappelli, 
2001, and Attanasio and Székely, 2004). Further research that tries to relate consumption 
inequality to income inequality includes papers by Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2004), 
Attanasio, Battitstin and Ichimura (2007), Krueger and Perri (2006) and Guvenen (2007).  
The paper by Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2007) is particularly interesting because it 
decomposes innovations to household income into ‘temporary’ and ‘permanent’ components. 
These authors consider how changes in the variance of permanent and transitory income 
components are translated into changes in the variance of consumption and estimate the 
fraction of permanent and transitory income shocks that are effectively insured. They find that 
a large fraction of temporary shocks are indeed insured, especially in the case of ‘better off’ 
households, while most (but not all) permanent shocks seem to be uninsured. We will come 
back to a possible interpretation of these results below.   
One can summarize the evidence on the implications of complete markets saying that the large 
majority of empirical work in this area points to a sound rejection of the hypothesis of perfect 
insurance.  This is true both in developed and developing countries. In developed countries it 
seems that low frequency, persistent shocks are not completely insured. However, one can 
often also reject the hypothesis that these shocks are completely uninsured and therefore fully 
reflected in consumption. This is not inconsistent with the evidence on ‘the excess smoothness 
of consumption’ we mentioned in Section 3.5.  On the other hand, it seems that transitory 
shocks are, to a large extent, insured. Given this evidence, therefore, the focus of much of the 
current research is on models without perfect risk sharing and incomplete markets.  
4.2. Exogenously incomplete markets.  
 
Much of the literature on consumption assumes that individuals have a certain number of 
exogenously given assets that they use to move resources over time. What is common to the set 
of studies we consider here is that the financial market structure and therefore the type of 
assets individuals have access to is exogenously given, as in the discussion in Section 3. Some 
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assets considered is exogenously given.  
Many studies have considered a situation in which consumers borrow and lend in an asset 
whose net supply is zero: in such a situation, individuals with (temporary) positive shocks will 
lend to individuals with (temporary) negative shocks. Models of this type are often referred to 
as ‘Bewley’ models, from Bewley (1983), who was among the first to study the competitive 
equilibrium in a model where individuals try to smooth income fluctuations over time. Other 
versions of the model also consider the presence of aggregate saving, which can play a role in 
production, as, for instance, in Aiyagari (1994).  Finally, while some versions of the model allow 
for both borrowing and saving, others prohibit borrowing.  
The equilibrium conditions that are relevant in the presence of exogenously missing markets 
are effectively those we discussed in the first part of Section 3 and that have been used for the 
empirical work on the life cycle model. The Euler equation (12) in Section 3.2 is the relevant 
equilibrium condition when individuals can borrow and lend at the interest rate 
k r  in asset k. 
If consumers are prevented from borrowing and are at the corner in terms of their asset 
position, the relevant condition becomes the inequality in equation (14).  It is worth stressing 
that, even in the presence of borrowing restrictions, the expression in (14) can hold as equality 
if the liquidity constraints is not binding between two given time periods. 
22 
 Notice the difference between the Euler equation implied by the Bewley model and the first 
order condition of the social planner problem. First, the first order condition (12) holds in 
expectations, while equation (21) holds state by state. Second, there is no individual Euler 
equation in the full insurance case, but something similar to it. To see this, one can appeal to 
the aggregation theorem referred to in the last paragraph and derive the Euler equation for the 
representative consumer. In this sense, as is obvious, the model with complete markets is much 
more restrictive.  
We have already discussed the evidence on Euler equations and liquidity constraints in Section 
3. We now move on to the discussion of economies where markets are not complete because 
of the presence of specific imperfections. Unlike the economies we have considered so far, the 
market structure and the assets available to an individual consumer are not given, but are 
determined as an equilibrium outcome.  
                                                 
22 Indeed, if one considers the so called ‘natural’ liquidity constraints that is the present discounted value of the 
lowest income realization with a positive probability of occurring, under some regularity conditions on the utility 
function, the constraint will never be binding. But even for lower bounds, such as zero, the liquidity constraint 
might be binding only occasionally.  
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As we mentioned above, there is strong evidence that rejects the hypothesis of complete 
contingent markets that provide full insurance against idiosyncratic risk.  An important 
theoretical and empirical challenge, therefore, is to construct models in which full risk sharing 
is not achieved in equilibrium because of the presence of specific imperfections. From a 
theoretical view point, it is certainly preferable to map the nature of imperfections one 
considers into particular market structures rather than making more or less ad-hoc assumptions 
about the nature of markets. From a policy point of view, the fact that the market structure is 
an equilibrium outcome allows one to take into account the possible effects that given policy 
interventions have on the nature and extent of private insurance markets. This might be 
fundamental to evaluate the effects of a given policy. 
The literature on endogenously incomplete markets has mainly focussed on two types of 
imperfections: imperfect information and imperfect enforceability of contracts. We discuss 
these two classes of models in turn.  
4.3.1.  Imperfect information models  
  
In imperfect information models individuals are assumed to have private information either 
about their income or about the effort they put in producing income (moral hazard). It is 
therefore necessary, when looking at an insurance market, to guarantee that in equilibrium 
individuals are induced to reveal their private information. The constrained efficient allocation 
of resources can be studied in a way similar to the case of perfect insurance, by looking at the 
problem solved by a social planner. A problem like (20) has to be supplemented with the 
incentive compatibility constraints that guarantee the revelation of private information. From a 
methodological point of view, the characterization of these contracts can become extremely 
complex, as the transfers through which the social planner redistributes income among private 
agents can be a function of the entire history of individual past income. A big methodological 
breakthrough in this literature came with the Thomas and Worrall (1990) and Atkeson and 
Lucas (1992) papers in which these authors re-wrote the problem in terms of ‘promised 
utilities’.
23 This technical trick allows a relatively simple characterization of the equilibrium.  
                                                 
23 Other important papers in this literature include Green (1987), Phelan and Townsend (1991). 
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useful to study the empirical implications of these models (see Ligon, 1998). In contrast to the 
permanent income model, where the marginal utility of consumption follows a martingale, here 
it is the reciprocal of the marginal utility of consumption that has this property. In particular, it 
can be proven that: 
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The intuition behind this results follows from the fact that the problem, in the Atkeson and 
Lucas (1992) approach, is formulated in terms of promised utilities that are obtained as a 
function of consumption, by inverting the utility function. From (25) it follows that, given 
Jensen’s inequality, the standard Euler equation for consumption will not hold. This is 
consistent with the fact that, in this world, all aggregate saving is done through the social 
planner. Like in the full information case we discuss above, as the social planner observes 
private savings, she can use aggregate wealth to maximize aggregate utility and adjust transfers 
to replicate any allocation achieved without private assets in a situation in which these assets are 
held by the individual consumers. As agents do not hold assets, there is no necessity for the 
standard Euler equation to hold. Equation (25), instead, holds as part of the dynamic incentive 
compatibility constraint.  
In this world if consumers were left to their own devices, they would save too much compared 
to the social optimum corresponding to equation (25). This has important policy implications 
for optimal capital income taxation.
24  
Not many empirical papers have studied asymmetric information models of the type described 
here. An exception is Ligon (1998), one of the first papers that tries to discriminate between 
the self insurance (permanent income hypothesis) and the imperfect information partial 
insurance models. Ligon fits three different models by maximum likelihood using per-capita 
consumption data for households living in the three Southern Indian villages studied by 
Townsend (1994).  Ligon points out that the only difference between the permanent income 
hypothesis Euler equation and the imperfect information inverse Euler equation (25) lies in the 
                                                 
24 An interesting result in this literature is the so called ‘immiserization’: because of the trade-off between 
incentives and insurance faced in each period by the planner, the efficient allocation equilibrium implies ‘an ever-
increasing fraction of resources to an ever-diminishing fraction of society’s population’ (Atkeson and Lucas, 1992, 
see also Green, 1987, as well as  Thomas and Worrall, 1990)  
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E : in the former case, this is 
minus the coefficient of relative risk aversion, in the latter case it is plus the coefficient of relative 
risk aversion. In the case of full insurance, this coefficient cannot be estimated, because there is 
no variability across households in consumption growth. The exercise can be carried out for a 
number of different instrument sets, and is consistent with permanent income behaviour in 
one village, and with imperfect information behaviour in the other two. Full information 
cannot be rejected in some cases.  
 
In the standard asymmetric information model, it is often assumed that income or effort are 
not observable and contractable upon. At the same time, however, it is assumed that individual 
assets are fully observable. This assumption implies that, when considering the social planner 
problem that is often used to characterize the equilibrium in this class of models, one can 
dispose of individual assets altogether and assume that all assets are held by the social planner. 
Any equilibrium with private asset ownership can be replicated by an appropriate set of 
transfers. The situation becomes very different when not only individual income but also assets 
are not publicly observable. This problem has been analyzed in an important recent paper by 
Cole and Kocherlakota (2002). These authors show that in their model the constrained efficient 
allocation coincides with the one would occur when agents are allowed to save with a single 
asset paying a fixed interest rate.  
When agents have the possibility of saving on their own, they will use this intertemporal 
margin. This implies two things. First, from a technical point of view, the Euler equation for 
consumption will have to hold (and indeed it becomes part of the incentive compatibility 
constraints). Second, agents, because of their ability to transfer resources over time, will have a 
strong preference for strategies that lead to high net present value transfers. Moreover, they will 
prefer, ceteris paribus, transfers that are front loaded. Finally, the relative preference for front 
loading will be stronger for agents with a low income realization than for agents with a high 
income realization. The implication of this will be that incentive compatible transfers cannot 
deliver less net present value to high income agents. But risk sharing would imply giving more 
net present value to low income agents. Therefore, incentive compatibility works exactly in the 
opposite direction than insurance. It turns out that in the constrained efficient allocation, all 
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technology.  
This result has been considered particularly important because it constitutes a micro foundation 
for a specific market structure (a single bond with a fixed interest rate) that has been widely 
used in the literature and that we have been discussing above. It would therefore seem that 
imperfect information about income and assets could provide a justification for a market 
structure where the only type of insurance agents can get is self-insurance, through savings. 
The Cole and Kocherlakota (2001) result, which is reminiscent of the results in Allen (1985), is 
an important one, even though some recent papers have claimed that it is not very robust. 
Abraham and Pavoni (2004), for example, have shown that in a model with pure moral hazard 
(rather than adverse selection of the type considered in Cole and Kocherlakota), one obtains 
their results only under very strong assumptions on the nature of the income process and of 
the moral hazard.  
In a recent paper, Attanasio and Pavoni (2008), have shown that in a relatively general moral 
hazard model with hidden assets, the social planner can provide more insurance to the agents 
than in the bond economy mentioned above. In particular, the amount of risk sharing that can 
occur in equilibrium depends on the severity of the moral hazard problem. Attanasio and 
Pavoni (2008) write examples for which a closed form solution can be derived and in which the 
amount of risk sharing over and above that obtained by self insurance can be related to the 
degree of excess smoothness discussed in Section 3 and estimated on aggregate data by 
Campbell and Deaton (1989). In particular, these authors can interpret the degree of excess 
smoothness as reflecting the severity of the moral hazard problem. The larger the output loss 
involved with shirking, the easier it is to provide incentives and, therefore, insurance, and the 
larger is the degree of ‘excess smoothness’, i.e. the lesser is the response of consumption to 
innovations to permanent income. In their empirical work, Attanasio and Pavoni (2008) frame 
their test as a test of the intertemporal budget constraint, along the lines proposed by Hansen, 
Roberds and Sargent (1991). Risk sharing over and above the self-insurance provided by saving 
results in a violation of the intertemporal budget constraint with a single asset because it 
ignores the transfers connected with this insurance arrangement. Attanasio and Pavoni (2009) 
show evidence from UK micro data that is consistent with excess smoothness and interpret it 
within their theoretical framework.  
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about the optimal taxation of capital. In particular, some recent contributions have shown how 
imperfect information can provide a rationale for capital taxation, which contradicts the 
standard Ramsey result on optimal dynamic fiscal policy. Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski 
(2003) show that in a model with unobserved and evolving skills it is indeed optimal to have a 
positive rate of taxation of capital income, although the Atkinson-Stiglitz result of uniform 
commodity taxation survives. The positive taxation of capital follows from the fact that the 
standard Euler equation does not hold, and instead the ‘inverse Euler equation’ does.  The 
intuition behind this result is that, in these models, an increase in capital has two effects on 
welfare in the following period. On one hand, as in the standard model, it increases the 
resources available to the individual in the second period. On the other, it has a negative effect 
on incentives. In other words, it is optimal for the government to introduce a wedge between 
the interest rate paid to and the interest rate received by the consumer – by taxing interest rates 
the government reduces private savings. 
25 
 
The exploration of models with asymmetric information and their implications for risk sharing 
and consumption behaviour is only beginning. There are very few empirical studies of this type 
of model, which constitute an exciting and important research agenda. Kocherlakota and 
Pistaferri (2009), whose paper we discuss in Section 5, is an example.  
4.3.2.  Imperfect enforceability of contracts  
 
The other imperfection that the literature has explored as a possible reason for the lack of 
complete markets is the imperfect enforceability of contracts. There might be situations in 
which institutions that guarantee the execution of contracts are not developed enough and, as a 
consequence, individuals only enter contracts that are self enforceable. These models have been 
studied in a variety of contexts.
26  
                                                 
25 The paper by Golosov, Kocherlakota  and Tsyvinski (2003) has been followed by other contributions that have 
looked at different aspects of this type of model. In particular, while this paper does  not provide results on the 
decentralization of the constrained efficient allocations they study, Albanesi and Sleet (2006) and Kocherlakota 
(2006) study tax systems that could decentralize those allocations. More recently Fahri and Werning (2006) have 
considered the quantitative implications of models in which the inverse Euler equation holds. 
26 Thomas and Worrall (1988) introduced some of the concepts used in this literature in the context of wage 
contracts. Kehoe and Levine (1993) introduced a very simple framework in which, in a deterministic world, simple 
idiosyncratic income fluctuations cannot be smoothed because of these enforceability problems. Kocherlakota 
(1996) analyzes a consumption problem, while Keohe and Levine (2001) extend their 1993 model to consider 
stochastic environments. Coate and Ravallion (1993) represents an early contribution which looked at the 
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resemble some of the features seen in reality. In particular, one can generate interpersonal 
transfers of resources that are midway between insurance and loans. This type of allocations 
has been observed in several developing countries: Udry (1994) for instance, describes loan 
contracts in Northern Nigeria where the terms of the contract (interest rate and maturity) vary 
ex-post with the shocks received both by borrowers and  lenders.  Platteau, Murickan and 
Delbar (1985), instead, describing fisheries in Kerala, India, refer to quasi credit arrangements. 
In both cases, a distinctive features of the observed contracts and implied transfers, is that they 
are state contingent, like insurance contracts. On the other hand, they seem to have a memory, 
like debt contracts.  
To understand how limited enforceability contracts may induce this type of transfers, it is 
useful to consider a simple example in which there are only two individuals, A and B. In such a 
situation, one can consider a social planner problem (like 16) and augment it with two 
participation constraints. These imply that each of the two consumers, in each history, prefers 
being in the contract to reneging and consuming its current income. With two consumers a 
given transfer will imply moving some resources from one consumer to the other. Clearly, only 
the participation constraint for one of the two individuals can be binding. This implies that 
only one of the two Kuhn tucker multipliers associated to the participation constraints is 
positive, while the other is zero. Thomas and Worrall (1988) and Ligon, Thomas and Worrall 
(2002) show that the behaviour of the two consumer economy can be summarized by a single 
state variable, which is the ratio of marginal utilities of the two consumers. Notice that under 
perfect risk sharing, this ratio is a constant and equal to the ratio of Pareto weights. In this 
context, however, this is not any longer true. Instead, when the participation constraint of one 
of the two consumers is binding, the ratio of marginal utilities will move. It is as if the social 
planner changes the consumption allocation relative to the one that would be observed under 
                                                                                                                                                     
consequences of lack of enforceability for consumption allocations. The contracts considered in that paper, 
however, are not fully efficient, as they are restricted to be stationary. An important issue is the concept of 
equilibrium one uses. One wants to construct and characterize contracts that, in some sense, are self-enforceable. 
It is therefore necessary to establish what happens out of equilibrium, when somebody does not respect the terms 
of a contract. Most of the papers in this literature have resorted to the equilibrium concept proposed by Abreu, 
Pearce and Stacchetti (1990): when somebody deviates from the contract, the economy reverts to the worst sub-
game perfect equilibrium, which turns out to be autarky. The punishment, on the basis of which some risk sharing 
is implemented, therefore consists in denying the benefits from future risk sharing. The amount of utility an 
individual can derive in the absence of risk sharing determines crucially the amount of risk sharing that can be 
sustained in equilibrium.  
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in the contract and leaving. This implies rewarding the constrained consumer with a shift in 
promised utility. Effectively the Pareto weights that are an exogenous constant (which pick a 
specific competitive equilibrium) under perfect risk sharing, become endogenous and move to 
guarantee enforceability.  
In such a situation it can happen that, if consumer A receives a sequence of consecutive 
positive shocks and is ‘constrained’ by the risk sharing agreement, the ratio of marginal utilities 
shifts progressively in her favour. It can therefore also happen that in some situations, 
consumer B, after receiving an income below her long-term average, actually transfers 
resources to consumer A who has experienced a positive shock.
27 This type of behaviour 
makes the optimal contract, in this situation, resemble a debt contract: having borrowed from 
A, B is repaying some of her debt. However, the analogy only lasts until B is constrained by her 
participation constraint. When that happens, all past history is erased and the transfer of 
resources will be determined only by the necessity of keeping consumer B in the contract. 
When neither participation constraint binds, the efficient equilibrium will dictate that the ratio 
of marginal utility is kept constant and transfers of resources between the two consumers will 
guarantee that.  
Clearly the nature of preferences and the properties of income processes will determine the 
amount of risk sharing that can be sustained in equilibrium. For instance, it can be proven that 
if the discount factor is high enough, perfect risk sharing will be sustainable, while if it is low 
enough, autarky is the only equilibrium. In general (but not always), an increase in the variance 
of income will lead to an increase in risk sharing, as it makes the value of autarky lower,
28 while 
an increase in the persistence of idiosyncratic income will reduce risk sharing. This class of 
models has been applied widely: Alvarez and Jerman (2000) have studied the asset pricing 
implications of these models and stressed how the price of risk is determined by a subset of 
agents, while Kehoe and Perri (2002) have looked at the implications for international financial 
markets.  In an interesting paper, Azariadis and Lambertini (2003) have introduced imperfectly 
                                                 
27 It turns out that this type of situation can only occur if there are aggregate shocks. 
28 Whether an increase in the variance of income causes a decrease or an increase in the amount of risk sharing 
depends on a variety of factors but, in particular, on how one increases the variance. If it is increased by expanding 
the range of income values it is possible to have a decrease in risk sharing. This is because the value of autarky for 
individuals at the right tail of the income distribution might go up if the discount factor is low enough. On the 
other hand, when the variance is increased by keeping the support of the income process unchanged and 
increasing the weights on the tails one gets an increase in the amount of risk sharing as the value of autarky 
declines.  
  56enforceable contracts in an overlapping generations model. There, to get some risk sharing, 
punishment must imply a prohibition on saving, as well as participation in insurance markets.  
 
There is not much empirical work on models with imperfectly enforceable contracts. One of 
the earliest contributions can be found in Foster and Rosenzweig (2001), who extend the 
dynamic limited commitment model to the case where consumers have altruistic preferences. 
They stress that altruism within extended families has an ambiguous effect on risk-sharing 
arrangements: there are greater utility gains from insurance, but scope for insurance is more 
limited if incomes of family members are highly correlated. Also, if altruism is very strong, the 
threat of autarky is no longer credible, and the mutual insurance scheme loses some of its 
appeal. Foster and Rosenzweig use transfer information data for the same three Indian villages 
analysed by Townsend, and show that imperfect commitment effects (generating history 
dependence) are generally important, but transfers are more responsive to shocks and less 
history dependent when income correlation is lower and altruism is moderate – as is the case of 
transfers to family members who live outside the village – in line with model predictions.  
Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (2002) develop, solve and estimate a model with imperfect 
enforceability in a context where saving/borrowing is not allowed. They use the same Indian 
village data of Townsend (1994) and Ligon (1998), and carry out fully structural estimation of 
the three deep parameters that characterize the solution (subjective discount factor, relative risk 
aversion, and a state-independent punishment for reneging on the dynamic insurance 
arrangement), conditional upon the estimated income process. Two estimation procedures are 
carried out – one where the criterion function is in terms of the difference between observed 
and predicted individual log consumption, another one where the criterion function is instead 
the difference between changes of individual consumption shares over time. Even though 
estimated parameters take sensible values, they can either explain the distribution, or the 
dynamics, of consumption – not both.   
Dubois, Jullien and Magnac (2008) add formal, incomplete contracts to a model of dynamic, 
limited commitment with storage. These contracts are meant to capture such arrangements as 
land-renting and share-cropping. They derive the efficient equilibrium allocation that is 
characterised by two equations; an Euler equation linking consumption growth to lagged 
consumption and current income because of the limited commitment insurance scheme (that 
introduces a borrowing restriction term in an otherwise standard equation), and an income 
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contracts.  
Dubois, Jullien and Magnac (2008) stress that the existence of formal contracts may either help 
or hinder informal transfers, as it affects both incentives and the possibilities without an 
agreement, a point also made by Attanasio and Rios-Rull (2000), and further developed in 
Albarran and Attanasio (2003). An important contribution of the paper by Dubois, Jullien and 
Magnac is the derivation of  (non-linear) estimable equations for income and consumption – in 
their application to Pakistani village data they can thus avoid fully structural estimation, that is 
highly computer intensive (to the point that Ligon, Thomas and Worrall do not even report 
standard errors of their estimated deep parameters!). They show that the model is not rejected 
by the data, and that their estimated parameters imply that the probability of a self-enforcing 
contract binds is 10% if the relative risk aversion parameter is assumed to be equal to 1.5.
29    
 
Most if not all of the papers we have cited so far assume complete information. This implies 
the possibility of complete contingent markets: (self) enforceability is the only constraint that is 
imposed on the contracts available to an individual. These assumptions do not seem too strong 
for simple village economies, of the type studied by Udry (1998)
30 and Platteau, Murickan and 
Delbar (1985). Whether they make these models relevant for developed economies is an 
interesting question. However, much has been learned from them. And interesting directions of 
research can be taken up. First, one can in principle try to introduce simultaneously 
information and enforceability problems. Atkeson (1991) considers one such model in the 
context of international financial markets. Phelan (1998) consider one sided lack of 
commitment and asymmetric information in a banking model. Alternatively, one can also 
introduce punishments that differ from the permanent exclusion from financial markets. Lustig 
and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005), for instance, have considered collateral constraints, in that 
individual consumers can only borrow against their housing wealth. This induces interesting 
effects of house prices on consumption and, more generally on asset pricing. 
 
 
                                                 
29 Other papers that have studied this class of models are Kehoe and Perri (2002) and Kehoe and Levine (2001)  
30 Udry (1998), however, stresses the importance of private information in the region of Nigeria he studies.  
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The standard model we have considered so far assumes that individuals solve a well specified 
optimization problem and the observed outcomes reflect, by and large, this type of behaviour. 
This approach might find it hard to explain some facts that have attracted attention in recent 
years, with the increased interest in the so-called behavioural economics. These facts generally 
refer to deviations from optimal behaviour. It has become fashionable to report anecdotes 
about apparently irrational or sub-optimal behaviour that ‘leaves money on the table’. In this 
section we discuss some of these puzzles and the evidence that generates them and try to put 
the issues in perspective.  
Our general take is that a model of individual behaviour cannot fit the data perfectly and there 
will always be room for unexplained behaviour, which for lack of a better word, we define as 
‘taste shocks’. Of course, if one were to find out that there are systematic deviations of 
observed behaviour from what is predicted by the model and that most observations need a 
‘taste shock’, it would be an indication that the model is not a good representation of reality. 
The model would lose its predictive power and its usefulness.  The issue is whether the model 
is able to capture some key features of individual behaviour and in particular the response to 
economic incentives. This is, in the end, what matters not only from a theoretical point of view, 
but also from a policy perspective.  
We argue that in the case of life cycle consumption and saving decisions it is important to build 
models that are flexible enough to reflect the complexity of the environment and incentives 
that individuals face. It is also important to take into account the constraints (in terms of 
information as well as resources) that individuals are subject to. We will come back to these 
issues in the conclusions.   
We start this Section by listing some of the puzzles that have been identified in the literature. 
We then discuss some extensions and modifications of the standard model that have been 
proposed in the literature.  
5.1. Some puzzles  
 
The literature has identified a number of facts that seem to be inconsistent with the standard 
versions of the life cycle model that we have discussed so far. Here we list some of those that 
have received most attention.  
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A series of recent papers (Madrian and Shea, 2001, Choi, Laibson, Madrian and Metrick, 2002, 
2004, 2006) have documented that default options have important and surprising effects on the 
structure and level of saving of individual households. In particular, these papers have shown 
that if newly hired individuals are enrolled by default into a 401(k) retirement plan (rather than 
having to enrol), they are much more likely to participate, even though they have the possibility 
of opting out of the plan. In other words, the evidence seems to indicate that individuals with 
the same opportunity set make different choices depending on the default option they are 
(exogenously) assigned to. As the authors of these papers note, this fact contradicts the 
standard model where, in the absence of large adjustment costs, the default option should not 
matter. The authors of these papers propose a number of different explanations, ranging from 
the importance of ‘inertial behaviour’ and procrastination (possibly induced by the difficulty of 
the problem relative to individual ability to solve it) to the possibility that defaults are somehow 
perceived as a form of endorsement or advice, to ‘present bias’.  
More recent papers, such as Carroll, Choi, Libson, Madrian and Metrick (2009) and Choi, 
Laibson, Madrian and Metrick (2009), show that inertial behaviour might extend to other 
related phenomena. The former paper, for instance, shows that, in addition to default, even 
forcing individuals to make an explicit choice (without giving them a default option) has an 
important effect on the decision to enrol in retirement plans. The latter, instead, show that the 
portfolio allocation of individuals with (exogenously) different allocations of the employer’s 
matched contributions is not systematically different, while it should be under a standard 
model.     
2. Demand for commitment devices.  
 There is evidence that individuals are interested in devices that tie their hands in some relevant 
economic domain. For instance, Della Vigna and Malmendier (2006) discuss the choice of 
contracts offered by three health clubs, and taken up by their members: surprisingly large 
fractions of individuals choose to pay a flat monthly fee, but then rarely show up at the gym. 
For these individuals, the option of a 10-visit pass would work out to be much cheaper. An 
explanation is that consumers are willing to pay more for contracts that force them to do what 
is right for them in the long run, but is hard in the short run.  Thaler and Benartzi (2004) report 
evidence on the first three implementations of a program whereby people commit in advance 
to allocating a portion of their future salary increases toward retirement savings. This 
programme has had a very high take up rate (almost 80%) and has led participants to save 
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evidence from the sale of a commitment savings product for a Philippine bank that led to 
significant and lasting increases in savings by those customers who were offered it and 
purchased it. Thus there is evidence that consumers not only like to tie their hands in saving 
decisions, but that they save more as a result.
31  
3) Credit cards debt with low interest asset holdings.  
Gross and Souleles (2002) were the first to point out that many households who borrow at 
high interest on credit cards have non-negligible investments in low-yield liquid assets. Laibson, 
Repetto and Tobacman (2003) report that among households with a head between ages 20-29 
that are in the top wealth quartile, three-fourths did not repay their credit card bills in full. For 
households whose head in the thirties, over 80% of median wealth-holders had credit card 
debt. Even among the households with a head between ages 50-59 that were between the 50th 
and 75th wealth percentiles, 56% borrowed and paid interest on credit card debt in the past 
month. Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman (2009) conclude that “The typical American 
household accumulates wealth in the years leading up to retirement and simultaneously 
borrows on their credit cards”.  
4) High saving rates in developing countries. 
The life-cycle model explains cross-country differences in saving rates as follows: in high 
growth countries the young – who save – are life-time richer than the old – who dis-save. This 
explains why high growth countries save more.  The very high saving rates in China have been 
explained by Franco Modigliani and Shi Larry Cao (2004), who point to the effects of the one-
child policy on middle aged families in a country where most people cannot expect to receive a 
pension when they retire.  The demographic imbalance implies that the traditional mechanism 
of intergenerational risk-sharing cannot be expected to provide adequate coverage for risks 
related to longevity and old age health problems. Private savings are then the only way to 
ensure an acceptable standard of living in old age. Recently, Chamon and Prasad (2007) have 
used micro data to analyze household saving rates by urban Chinese and found that the age 
profile of savings displays a U-shape. This is hard to explain in a standard life cycle model, 
where non-pension wealth should be decumulated in old age. The evidence that at least in 
some high-growth countries (China, Taiwan) the older generations save could be due to some 
form of habits (Paxson, 1996).   
                                                 
31 DellaVigna (2009) reviews a number of other papers in this area.  
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The equity premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott, 1985) has attracted much attention in the 
macro-finance literature. Given the historically high equity premium (the difference in expected 
return between stocks and bonds), asset markets equilibrium requires consumers to have very 
high risk aversion. This, in models with expected utility maximization and intertemporally 
separable preferences, in turn would imply a very low elasticity of intertemporal substitution, 
contrary to the empirical evidence and inconsistent with equilibrium conditions for the risk-free 
interest rate.   
A number of possible solutions for this puzzle have been presented in the literature. One 
prominent hypothesis is the presence of habits in the utility function, as in Campbell and 
Cochrane (1999). We discuss habits, different ways in which they can be modelled and the 
evidence on their presence below. However, Bansal and Yaron (2004) claim that habits are not 
required to explain the key patterns of financial returns and consumption data, as long as one 
recognizes the existence of time-varying risk premia that generate consumption growth 
predictability. Bansal and Yaron, in particular, allow for the presence of a small long run 
predictable component in consumption growth and show that their model, with Epstein-Zin 
preferences, can explain several features of observed asst prices. More recently, some papers, 
including Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005), Chien, Cole and Lustig (2009), Lustig and 
Chien (2009) and Kocherlakota and Pistaferri (2009) have considered the asset pricing 
implications of models with asymmetric information and suggested that this class of models 
could be part of the solution to the equity premium puzzle. 
An issue conceptually related to the equity premium puzzle is the limited participation into 
financial markets: in most countries relatively few households actively hold shares and equities. 
This has been labelled the stockholding puzzle by Haliassos and Bertaut (1995): given the 
relatively high returns on equities that have prevailed in many countries, households should 
invest at least some of their wealth in stocks. Even though this issue relates to the equity 
premium, it has not been addressed in the context of habits or imperfect information models, 
rather in models where consumers are affected by transaction costs or have access to limited 
financial information. 
32  
                                                 
32 Studies that have looked at this issue include Luttmer (1999), Mankiw and Zeldes (1991), Basak and 
Cuoco (1998), Attanasio, Banks and Tanner (2002), Vissing-Jorgensen (2002),   Paiella (2003), Attanasio 
and Paiella (2006) and Guvenen (2009).  
 
  625.2. Modifying the basic model  
5.2.1.  Relaxing geometric discounting.  
 
There is evidence, briefly reviewed earlier on, that individuals are interested in devices that tie 
their hands in saving decisions and that they save more as a result. The standard model of 
intertemporal decisions is at pains to explain this type of behaviour – where consumers 
apparently fear their lack of control and their inability to stick to their chosen optimal plan. 
Time inconsistent or temptation preferences have been proposed to rationalize some of the 
facts.  
An elegant way to introduce time-inconsistent preferences is provided by the quasi hyperbolic 
discounting framework proposed by Laibson (1997) who developed ideas previously 
introduced by Strotz (1956) and Phelps and Pollak (1968). Consumers are assumed to 
maximize the expected value of the following life-time utility index: 
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This implies that a different, lower discount factor is used to choose between this period and 
the next (the product of β and δ) and between any two other periods (δ), in agreement with 
experimental evidence provided by Thaler (1981) and Benzion, Rappoport and Yagil (1989). 
This discounting mechanism generates time inconsistent plans, with too little saving for 
retirement. Naïve consumers can do little about this, but sophisticated consumers recognize the 
problem and tie their hands, to prevent their current self from leaving their future selves in 
financial distress. This explains why consumers may choose to enter long-term saving 
commitment plans, such as 401(k)’s in the US (Choi, Laibson, Madrian and Metrick, 2006), or 
other committed saving products (Asharf, Katlan and Yin, 2006).  
 
The quasi hyperbolic discounting model lends itself to estimation and testing, but requires 
solving for the consumption function numerically. Even though an Euler equation for this 
model has been derived, its empirical use is limited, because it involves the marginal propensity 
to consume out of wealth (Harris and Laibson, 2001). It also suffers from some potential 
difficulties related to the definition of the time period, that crucially affects the properties of 
the solution but the length of which is arbitrarily set by the researcher.  
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rational impatience has been put forward by Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, 2004), who stress the 
importance of self-control problems leading to the postponement of saving. Their model can 
be characterized by a period-t utility function as follows (Bucciol, 2009):  
        ( ) ( ) ( ) ( t t t t C U CH U C U U − − = ) τ                                                                                      (27) 
where CH denotes cash on hand (the sum of income and wealth), and τ is a non-negative 
constant. The larger τ is, the stronger the role played by temptation, inducing consumers to try 
and equalize consumption and cash in hand. (In this version of the model, consumption cannot 
exceed cash-on-hand).  
Amador, Werning and Angeletos (2006) consider the issue of optimal trade-off between 
commitment and flexibility in a model where individuals expect to receive relevant information 
regarding tastes and thus they value the flexibility provided by larger choice sets, but also 
expect to suffer from temptation, with or without self-control, and value the commitment 
afforded by smaller choice sets. Their key finding is that imposing a minimum level of savings 
is always a feature of the solution. This has important implications for public policy – 
compulsory contributions to social security or other retirement saving schemes may be justified 
on welfare grounds even if actuarially fair annuities are available to consumers. The optimal 
size of these contributions will depend not only on the preference parameters discussed above 
(the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the rate of time preference), but also on the 
impatience parameter in (27) or the self-control parameter in (28). In economies characterised 
by dynamic inefficiency, the presence of impatient or tempted consumers may help reduce the 
(excessive) amount of capital.    
The hyperbolic discounting model finds its justification mostly in experiments. Frederick, 
Loewenstein, and O'Donoghue (2002) provide an overview of experiments that support that 
notion that individuals discount the near and the distant future at different rates.  Rubinstein 
(2003) casts doubts on the interpretation given to the experimental evidence, by showing that 
differently designed experiments still suggest a marked preference for today versus tomorrow, 
but not in a way that is compatible with hyperbolic discounting. Recently, Fernandez-Villaverde 
and Mukherji (2008) claim that the role played by uncertainty biases results against exponential 
utility. To counter this criticism, Ameriks, Caplin, Lehay and Tyler (2007) devise a set of 
questions aimed at eliciting self-control problems directly and claim most people are affected 
by such problems (less so as they age). Fernandez-Villaverde and Mukherji (2008) devise a 
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device, while exponential discounters and naïve hyperbolic discounters should not. They report 
that only 13% choose the commitment device in their experiment.  
In recent years an increasing body of evidence comes also from estimation. Laibson, Repetto, 
and Tobacman (2009) follow a fully structural approach and show that the sophisticated 
hyperbolic discounting model can reconcile credit-card debt with illiquid asset holdings over 
the life-cycle. Bucciol (2009) follows a similar approach, but estimates the temptation model 
instead. To identify the parameters he uses liquid and quasi-liquid (retirement) wealth holdings 
at different ages as target moments. He finds evidence of a small, but significantly positive 
degree of temptation – when temptation is taken into account risk aversion is found to be less 
(and statistically different from) one. 
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5.2.2.  Relaxing intertemporal separability.  
 
The standard model presented in section 2 assumes preferences to be additive over time and 
over states of nature: this implies that risk aversion and intertemporal substitutions are 
functionally related. In the special case of the isoelastic function, the relative risk aversion 
coefficient is the reciprocal of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The assumption of 
intertemporal separability, however, might be too strong as it cannot capture phenomena such 
as habits and durability.  
The simplest way to introduce habits/durability of consumption is to write the utility function 
as follows: 
                                                                                                               (28)  u(xt −ϑ'xt−1;zt)
t ∑
where x is a vector of goods or services and z is any other variable that affects marginal utility 
(demographics, leisure, other goods that are not explicitly modelled). The ϑ  parameters are 
positive for goods that provide services across periods (durability), negative for goods that are 
addictive (habit formation) or zero for goods that are fully non-durable, non-habit forming  
(Hayashi, 1985).  
Eichenbaum and Hansen (1990) and Ogaki and Reinhard (1998) test and reject the separability 
of durables and non durables within the context of an Euler equation estimated on aggregate 
data. Alessie, Devereux and Weber (1997) and Padula (1999) tests and rejects separability 
                                                 
33 Mastrobuoni and Weinberg (2009) report that Social Security benefit recipients without savings (about a fourth 
of the sample) consume 25 percent fewer calories the week before they receive checks relative to the week 
afterwards. They show that their findings are consistent with hyperbolic discounting. 
  65between non durable consumption and the stock of cars using micro data from the FES and 
CEX, respectively.
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Habits have attracted much attention in the macro-finance literature. In the presence of habits, 
the functional restriction between intertemporal substitution and risk aversion is relaxed. 
Campbell and Cochrane (1999) make the distinction between the overall curvature (γ in the 
isoelastic case), that is relevant for intertemporal allocations of consumption, and the local 
curvature of the utility function, (γ over the surplus consumption ratio, that is the share of 
consumption net of habits over consumption), that is instead relevant for portfolio decisions. 
Habits can take various forms: today’s marginal utility may depend on the consumer’s own past 
consumption level (internal habits) or the past consumption level of other consumers (external 
habits). Campbell and Cochrane consider the case of external habits, where consumers are 
influenced by other households’ lagged consumption, not their own, and show that their model 
can solve the equity premium puzzle for plausible parameter values. The external habits  model 
seems to work better than the internal habits model on aggregate data, even though Chen and 
Ludvigson (2009) challenge this conclusion.  
Empirical macro-evidence on the presence of habits is quite mixed, and this may be due to the 
very nature of aggregate consumption data, as stressed in Dynan (2000). The serial correlation 
of aggregate consumption growth is affected by time aggregation (Heaton, 1993), aggregation 
over consumers, and by data construction methods (particularly for the services from durable 
goods). For this reason micro data seem preferable.  
The Euler equations corresponding to (28) involve x at four different periods of time, and their 
estimation typically requires panel data. High quality consumption panel data are rare, and this 
has limited the scope for empirical analysis. Meghir and Weber (1996) have used CEX quarterly 
data on food, transport and services (and a more flexible specification of intertemporal non-
separabilities than is implied by equation 28), and found no evidence of either durability or 
habits once leisure, stock of durables and cars as well as other conditioning variables are taken 
into consideration
35. 
                                                 
34  A special feature of durable goods is that they might be subject to adjustment costs. The case of convex 
adjustment costs is a relatively simple extension, and captures well repairs and maintenance activity (see Bernanke, 
1985). To model replacement decision, non-convex adjustment costs are  more plausible, as they lead to 
infrequent adjustment, and explain why durable goods are not replaced all the time – the seminal paper is 
Grossman and Laroque (1990) – applications are Eberly (1994), Attanasio (2000) and Bertola, Guiso and Pistaferri 
(2005).   
35 Indeed, Flavin and Nakagawa (2008) argue that the presence of non-separable, illiquid durable goods such as 
housing in a standard utility function explains the smoothness of aggregate non-durable consumption the same 
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food at home data. On the other hand, Carrasco, Labeaga and López-Salido (2005) use Spanish 
panel data that follow households over eight consecutive quarters and find evidence for habits, 
once they control for fixed effects. 
Habits are more likely to explain the high saving in developing countries puzzle if they persist 
over a long period. Angelini (2009) has worked out the analytical solution of the dynamic 
optimization problem when preferences are CARA and there are habits in the utility function. 
An interesting feature of the solution is the interplay of habits and the precautionary saving 
motive – another is the dependence of beginning of life consumption on “inherited habits” – a 
feature that could be exploited in empirical work in data sets that contain information on the 
standard of living enjoyed early in life, before leaving the parental home.  
 
The few studies that have used micro data on non-durable consumption items to investigate 
the issue find little or no evidence of habits, at least once preferences capture the presence of 
non-separabilities between goods and leisure.  
5.2.3.  Financial literacy and information.  
 
A standard assumption in the life cycle literature, made mainly for analytical and empirical 
convenience, is that of rational expectations. This assumption states that individuals know the 
stochastic environment in which they live, have at least as much information as the 
econometrician in making their consumption and saving decision and use it optimally. Recently 
much evidence has been gathered that sheds important doubts on this assumption. A number 
of papers (see, for instance, Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007, 2009, Lusardi and Tufano, 2009) have 
used explicit and quantitative measures of financial literacy and related them to individual 
financial decisions. Lusardi and Mitchell (2007, 2009) show that more ‘financially literate’ 
individuals are more ‘retirement ready’, while Lusardi and Tufano (2009) show that more 
‘financially literate’ youths are less likely to hold unsustainable debt.  It has also been shown 
that stock holdings are much less common among the less financially literate.  
Perhaps it is not surprising that financial sophistication affects individual behaviour. It could 
also be that financial literacy is correlated with other individual attributes (such as total human 
                                                                                                                                                     
way as the external habits model. This could reconcile the failure to find micro-evidence on habits with the 
success of the external habits model to fit the aggregate consumption and financial returns data. 
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some of the papers in the literature). However, the evidence that has been gathered so far is 
reasonably convincing and should be taken seriously.  
6.  Conclusions 
 
The aim of this paper was to survey the theoretical and empirical literature on the life cycle 
model to draw the implications that plausible versions of the model have for public policy and, 
in particular, for policies that influence the intertemporal allocation of resources. Rather than 
summarizing what we have been discussing above, we conclude this paper by taking a stand on 
what we think are profitable directions for future research.  
One possible reading of the empirical literature on the life cycle model is that it is possible to 
construct rich versions of the model that are not inconsistent with available micro data, 
especially for households headed by prime aged individuals. Much of this evidence comes from 
the estimation of Euler equations. Euler equations are remarkably useful because they let 
researchers estimate important preference parameters in a relatively robust way, allowing for - 
but without the need to explicitly model - important phenomena such as labour supply, 
housing, durables and so on.  
However, to conduct a useful policy debate it is necessary to be able to say something about 
the level of consumption. A reduced form approach that exploits key theoretical insights can 
shed light on some issues – for instance on the nature of particular business cycle episodes or 
whether consumers perceive specific shocks to be permanent or temporary. A structural form 
approach is more generally informative, but requires, except for special cases, numerical 
methods and simulations. Moreover, it requires specifying completely the environment in 
which economic agents operate, including their perceptions and information sets, institutional 
factors such as pensions and intertemporal trades available to them. The necessity to provide 
so much detail makes this approach inherently not robust. This is not to deny its usefulness, 
but to make it clear that the general validity of results obtained using simulated life cycle 
models is not to be taken for granted. 
Many of the features to be included in the model to make it realistic involve important non-
convexities that make the optimization problem difficult to solve numerically. Much progress 
has been made since the first numerical simulations of life cycle models with uncertainty were 
developed by Deaton (1991). Current models are able to consider in very sophisticated fashion 
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work, however, remains to be done to develop these models. Moreover, while some of the 
parameters of these models can be estimated by Euler equations, many of them cannot and one 
has to obtain sensible estimates of crucial parameters from alternative sources.  
There is still work to be done in term of understanding intertemporal preferences. The work on 
Euler equation has made it clear that one needs to take into account the evolution of individual 
needs and the non-separability between consumption and labour supply. Another aspect that 
has received less attention, but could turn out to be important, is the role played by durables 
and semi-durable commodities. There is some evidence of non separabilities that could be 
important in assessing individual responses to different shocks and innovations.  
The Euler equation approach is useful because it can allow for the presence of these non-
separabilities even when some of the choice variables are affected by non-convexities and other 
imperfections. The Euler equation provides equilibrium conditions that the policy functions 
that determine consumption and other  choice variables have to satisfy and that can be used to 
estimate structural parameters even if we cannot characterize these policy functions explicitly. 
However,  to understand the intertemporal allocation of resources, how individuals smooth 
shocks, how they react to policy innovations these policy functions become essential. Studies 
that do this in a systematic fashion are few and far in betweens. In our opinion, an important 
paper is Browning and Crossley (2009) that looks at how individuals use the timing of the 
purchase of durables to smooth out specific transitory shocks. Much more work is necessary in 
this direction. The recent recession and some of the policy measures taken in the UK can 
supply important examples of questions to which policy makers would like to have answers 
that economists are still unable to provide. For instance, if one lowers temporarily the rate of 
indirect taxation, what is the effect on consumption and, in particular, on durable purchases? 
And how does the answer change when the decrease happens in response to an increase in the 
level of uncertainty in the economy?   
Another important potential use of this class of models is to study aggregate consumption and 
saving and, possibly, to construct realistic equilibrium models. The work on this is still in its 
infancy and faces some severe problems. The life cycle model is an intrinsically dynamic model 
in which choices depend on future variables. The equilibrium values of these variables depend, 
in turn, on the behaviour of all consumers in the economy. It is therefore difficult to establish 
what determines equilibrium values. Other equilibrium phenomena that are important and 
interesting are the determination of the type of assets that are available to individuals both to 
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information problems (adverse selection and moral hazard) are important.  
The explicit modelling of imperfections and frictions that cause markets to be incomplete is 
highly promising and potentially very useful in characterizing the implications that a structure 
such as the life cycle model has for policy. The recent exciting development of the new 
dynamic public economics is a good example of that.  
 
In section 5 we have mentioned a number of directions in which some strong assumptions 
routinely made in the literature on the life cycle model can be relaxed. The list contained in 
Section 5 is not exhaustive. However, we chose those topics that we think are more promising 
in terms of future research. The analysis of alternative preference structures, such as the 
analysis of temptation in Gul and Pesendorfer (2004), is very important and so is the 
consideration of habit formation.  
As for the model that relaxes geometric discounting, systematic empirical studies are still rare. 
The situation is slightly better in terms of habits, although the evidence based on micro data 
still comes from a handful of studies. The biggest limitation so far comes from the fact that 
many of these studies only consider habits with a very short duration, not necessarily because 
this is the most appealing model of habits but because of data limitations. The study with 
longer lasting habit stocks should be a high priority. Research on habits is likely to be important 
both to assess the plausibility of the claims that habits can be helpful in explaining some of the 
puzzles in finance and because they could explain the evolution of saving rates in fast-growing 
developing countries, such as China.  
Another area that deserves mention is the analysis of the role of financial literacy.  It is clear 
that in some aspects the standard model imposes very strong assumptions on the ability of 
agents to solve intertemporal optimization problem and on the information they have at their 
disposal. One possible alternative is to collect data on the information individuals agents have 
and on the information they act upon when making intertemporal choices (both saving and 
investment choices). If we cannot assume that agents are fully rational and have all the 
necessary information, proper modelling and empirical work requires measures of beliefs and 
expectations. Progress has been made in this direction (especially in measuring expectations). 
But much more work is necessary. In our opinion, measuring financial literacy (and its 
determinants) is an important direction of research. The same applies to individual beliefs, 
attitudes, and preferences. In the same way in which the development of survey methods has 
  70allowed in recent years a much more precise measurement of household financial wealth and 
(more recently) subjective expectations, we need to develop similar methods for the 
measurement of these other objects that are obviously key determinants of individual choices. 
Integrating these measures within rigorous but flexible structural models can yield high returns 
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